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INSIDE AGENCY PREEMPTION'
CatherineM. Sharkey*
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine
that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress
was the leading actor,and courts and commentatorsfocused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its
intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly
no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in
statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy
unchecked by the change in presidentialadministrations.
This Article confronts the profound implications for the administrative
rulemaking process caused by the ascendancy of federal agencies in the
preemption realm. Stakeholders with vested interests in preemption disputes, such as state governmental organizations, state attorneys general,
consumer- and business-orientedorganizations,and private litigants, can
continue to ignore the preemptive rulemaking processes within federal
agencies only at their peril. As this Article further shows, those processes
are, in and of themselves, rich areasfor investigation. Taking a unique perspective "inside" the preemptive rulemaking processes within five major
federal agencies that regulate in areas as diverse as health and safety,
banking, and the environment, this Article presents the first look at agencies' responses to President Obama's Memorandum on Preemption and
their efforts to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of Federalism Executive Order 13132, which governs preemptive rulemaking.

t © Catherine M. Sharkey, 2012. All rights reserved.
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellow (2011-12). This Article draws extensively from a
December 2010 Report that I prepared as an academic consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States, which adopted Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for
Considering Preemption of State Law, based on the Report. See Adoption of Recommendation, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011). For discussion and comments, I am grateful to Daniel
Farber, Abbe Gluck, Sally Katzen, Nina Mendelson, Gillian Metzger, Richard Pierce, Richard
Revesz, Stuart Shapiro, Jonathan Siegel, Paul Verkuil, Arthur Wilmarth, and Nicholas Wittner.
Matthew Shahabian (NYU 2011) provided extraordinary research assistance, and Robert
Keele (NYU 2012) assisted diligently with final revisions.
As part of this project, I conducted in-depth interviews with agency officials at the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"),
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). My thanks to the
agency officials who are named and cited in the Article, and especially to three officials who
gave me additional helpful feedback: Neil Eisner (Department of Transportation), Ken Munis
(EPA), and Steve Wood (NHTSA).
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With this empirical grounding in agency practice, the Article addresses
possibilitiesfor reform, including a novel attorney general preemption notification provision and a blueprintfor external review of newly proposed
internal oversight procedures. The specific reform measures are guided by
the overarching goals of (1) creating a "home" within agenciesfor consideration of the federalism values at stake in preemptive rulemaking and
ensuring participation in the rulemaking process by suitable representatives of state regulatory interests; and (2) establishing a system of internal
agency policing of the empirical and factual predicates to arguments for
preemption, coupled with external oversight.
This journey inside agency preemption charts preemption'sfuture path.
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INTRODUCTION

A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past,
Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue
to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has
witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in
statutory interpretation. While Congress, with the stroke of a pen, could definitively resolve preemption questions by specifying the impact of its
legislation on state law, in reality it often does not, but rather leaves open a
wide interpretive space for courts to fill.1 And while courts reiterate that
congressional intent is the touchstone of preemption analysis, they increasingly rely on the views propounded by federal agencies either in regulations
or else in preambles or litigation briefs.
At a superficial level, this shift might be attributable to mere politicsnamely, the efforts of a conservative administration (under George W. Bush)
1. Some legislation-such as the Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("MVSA") and the Consumer Product Safety Act-is marked by Congress's inclusion of both an express preemption
provision that would seem to oust competing state law and an express "savings" provision that
would seem to have the opposite effect. See 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006) (Consumer Product
Safety Act savings clause); id. § 2075(a) (Consumer Product Safety Act preemption clause);
49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (2006) (MVSA preemption clause); id. § 30103(e) (MVSA savings

clause).

MichiganLaw Review

[Vol. 110:521

to accomplish indirectly, via federal agencies, such tort reform goals as
eliminating common law tort liability that could not be achieved directly via
Congress. 2 Thus, with the change in administration (from George W. Bush
to Barack Obama), the story goes, we should expect a reversal, a power shift
away from agencies and back to Congress. But this political story obscures
more than it reveals about emerging jurisprudential trends.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy unchecked by the change in
presidential administrations. And the ever-growing role of agencies gives
scholars the coherent analytical framework for the Court's preemption jurisprudence-often characterized as a "muddle" 3-that they have long sought.4
The Court's pronouncement on preemption in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
America, Inc.5 provides the clearest illustration to date. There, the majority's
holding that a federal safety regulation did not preempt a state tort lawsuit
rested fundamentally on "the promulgating agency's contemporaneous explanation of its objectives, and the agency's current views of the regulation's
pre-emptive effect. ' 6 That seven justices signed on to an opinion relying
principally on the regulatory agency's current and past view of whether the
federal regulation should operate as a floor (compatible with more stringent
state law standards) or a ceiling (in conflict with additional state law requirements) is momentous. 7 Justice Clarence Thomas stood alone in his
objection to this agency-centric approach, chastising the Court for
"wad[ing] into a sea of agency musings and Government litigating positions

2. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs, Ins. & Auto. Safety of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing on Roof Strength], available at http://coinmerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
p=Hearings&ContentRecordid=50f68afl-c5f8-4494-907a-4af5d734a78d&ContentType-id=
14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group-id=bO6c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca 1978a
&MonthDisplay=6&YearDisplay=2008 (suggesting Bush Administration White House's
involvement in a preemption "plot" to "wipe out" people's access to courts); Am.Ass'N FOR
JUSTICE, GET OUT OF JAIL FREE: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

HELPS CORPORATIONS

ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY (2008), available at http://www.atlanet.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/
PreemptionRpt.pdf.
3. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) ("Most commentators
who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modem preemption jurisprudence is a
muddle:").
4. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 477 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption] ("Out of the preemption muddle, then, a glimmer of clarity emerges at least with
respect to the products liability cases-the Court's final decisions line up with the positions
urged by the agency.").
5. No. 08-1314, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011).
6. Williamson, slip op. at 6.
7. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred separately in the judgment, and Justice Elena
Kagan recused herself.
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and fish[ing] for what the agency may have been thinking 20 years ago
'8
when it drafted the relevant provision.
Justice Stephen Breyer (author of the Williamson majority opinion)
tipped his hand during oral argument, asking rhetorically:
Who is most likely to know what 40,000 pages of agency record actually
mean and say? People in the agency. And the second most likely is the [Solicitor General's] office, because they will have to go tell them.... So if
the government continuously says, this is what the agency means and the
agency is telling them, yes, this is what it means, the chances are they will
come to a better, correct conclusion than I will with my law clerks . ...

Justice Breyer characterized this agency-centric view as the triumph of the
"practical" over the "theoretical" perspective on preemption.'
The Court's embrace of this practical, agency-centric approach to
preemption comes against a backdrop of considerable concern over controversial agency interpretations of preemption. In 2009, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Wyeth v. Levine, which held that a state tort lawsuit brought
by a woman injured by a drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") was not impliedly preempted by the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act or FDA regulations. 1" In Levine, the Court looked with particular disdain on the procedural irregularities that accompanied FDA's inclusion of its
preemptive intent statement in the preamble to the drug labeling rule:
When the FDA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking in December
2000, it explained that the rule would "not contain policies that have federalism implications or that preempt -State law." In 2006, the agency finalized
the rule and, without offering States or other interested parties notice or
opportunity for comment, articulated a sweeping position on the FDCA's
8. Williamson, slip op. at 4 (Thomas, J., concurring). Seen in this light, Justice Thomas's opinion for a sharply divided Court in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, a generic drug preemption
case from that same term, see infra notes 149-171 and accompanying text, could be read to
signal a retreat from the Williamson supermajority's deference to the agency's position on
preemption. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993, slip op. at 6 n.3 (U.S. June 23, 2011)
("Although we defer to the agency's interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an
agency's ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be pre-empted."). But Justice
Thomas nonetheless joined a unanimous Court in according dispositive deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S.Ct. 871, 880
(2011) ("[W]e defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, advanced in a legal brief,
unless that interpretation is 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' (quoting
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997))). And the Mensing majority's propreemption
conclusion (though contrary to the position taken by FDA, the underlying agency) rests
squarely on the agency's interpretation of its regulations, which FDA could revise at any time
to square with its antipreemption position. In other words, the fate of preemption lies equally
in the hands of the agency under Mensing as it does under Williamson. Mensing is thus fully
consistent with this Article's premise of the ascendancy of federal agencies in the preemption
realm.
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Williamson, slip op.
10. See id. at 29-30.
11. 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009). Preemption is implied, as opposed to express, when the
statute does not contain an explicit preemption provision.
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pre-emptive effect in the regulatory preamble. The agency's 2views on state
law are inherently suspect in light of this procedural failure.1

FDA's approach to "preemption by preamble" did not comply with the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process or the state consultation mandates
of Federalism Executive Order 13132 ("E.O. 13132" or "the Federalism
Executive Order"); 3 accordingly, the Court did not accord deference to
FDA's propreemption position. The disregard shown by FDA (and other
federal agencies) toward procedural and consultative requirements for
preemption determinations highlights the risks of agency interpretation supplanting congressional intent.
Scholars have, to some degree, taken note of the pros and cons of the
ascendancy of federal agencies in the preemption realm, prompting a
robust, emergent debate of the comparative institutional competencies
among Congress, courts, and agencies in resolving the statutory interpretation, federalism, and regulatory policy issues that are embedded in
preemption disputes. 14 But these scholars have only begun to appreciate
the full extent of the transformation in process. Most significantly, they have
yet to recognize how the shift from Congress to the administrative rulemaking process calls for a comprehensive overhaul of internal agency
preemption procedures.
This Article confronts the profound implications for the administrative
rulemaking process caused by the ascendancy of federal agencies in the
interpretive realm. First, courts will increasingly look to the rulemaking
process and interrogate the agency record-as signaled by the Court in
Levine and even more directly in Williamson. Second, stakeholders in
preemption debates, including groups representing state and local elected
officials, consumer advocates, or business interest groups, should focus their
lobbying efforts on agencies and the rulemaking process, not (as is the current dominant strategy) exclusively on Congress.
Given this transformation, an overhaul of agency preemption procedures
is not only timely, but imperative. There appears to be consensus that the
requirements of the preemption provisions of E.O. 13132-including

12. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (citations omitted).
13. E.O. 13132 identifies federalism principles that bear consideration in policymaking
and specifies procedures for intergovernmental consultation, emphasizing consultations with
state and local governments and enhanced sensitivity to their concerns. See infra notes 24-43
and accompanying text.
14.

See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:How Federalism Can Improve
REV. 1 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (2008) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Presumption];Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.

the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.

737 (2004) [hereinafter -Mendelson, Chevron]; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the
New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability].
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consultation with the states and "federalism impact statements" 15-are
sound. But compliance with these provisions has been inconsistent, and
difficulties have persisted across administrations of both political parties. A
1999 Government Accountability Office ("GAO") Report identified only
five rules--out of a total of 11,000 issued from April 1996 to December
1998-that included a federalism impact statement. 16 Case studies of
particular rulemaking proceedings have revealed failures to comply with
E.O. 13132.17
This Article presents a unique perspective "inside" agency preemption,
first as a descriptive matter by focusing on agency practice and second as a
normative matter with an eye toward reform measures. It begins in Part I by
explaining the White House's efforts to exercise control over the agency
preemption process, both through E.O. 13132 and President Obama's May
2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption (the "Presidential Memorandum on Preemption" or "Preemption Memorandum")-which, in
addition to articulating the new administration's policy on preemption, condemned the practice of "preemption by preamble" and contained a directive
to agencies to conduct a ten-year retrospective review of all preemptive
rulemakings to ensure that they were legally justified and comported with
18
the administration's principles.
Part II is an on-the-ground empirical assessment of what federal agencies are doing with respect to preemption in the rulemaking and litigation
realms. The Article presents the first look at agencies' responses to the Presidential Memorandum on Preemption and their efforts to comply with the
relevant provisions of E.O. 13132 governing preemptive rulemaking. This
empirical work, focusing on agencies' awareness of the issue of preemptive
rulemaking and their compliance efforts, draws from my extensive interviews with high-level agency officials at the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), FDA, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), within the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), as well as my own independent review of the agencies' respective
rulemaking dockets and interventions in litigation. My findings contradict
commentators' claims that the Preemption Memorandum was merely a political act without any discernible practical effect.19 Instead, the
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOfT-GGD-99-93, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (1999). Executive Order
12612 is the precursor to E.O. 13132. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
17. See Mendelson, Presumption,supra note 14, at 719; Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2131-39.
18. Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693-94 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Preemption Memorandum],
availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-05-22/pdf/E9-12250.pdf#page=l.
19. Lawrence S. Ebner, President Obama's "Preemption Memo": Much To Do About
Very Little, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), June 19,
16.
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memorandum not only put an end to the "preemption by preamble" trend
but has also triggered real transformations within some federal agencies,
which, in turn, has revealed the continuing significance of agency participation in preemption, especially in the rulemaking context.
With this empirical grounding in agency practice, Part III of the Article
addresses possibilities for reform. The specific reform measures are guided
by the overarching goals of (1) creating a "home" within agencies for consideration of the federalism values at stake in preemptive rulemaking and
ensuring participation in the rulemaking process by suitable representatives
of state regulatory interests; and (2) establishing a system of internal agency
policing of the empirical and factual predicates to arguments for preemption, coupled with external oversight exercised by OIRA.
I. EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVES ON PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM

A. May 2009 PresidentialMemorandum on Preemption

On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum
announcing his administration's official policy on preemption: "[P]reemption
of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only
with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a
sufficient legal basis for preemption. ' 20 The memorandum specifically
admonished department and agency heads to cease the practice of "preemption by preamble"-in which preemption statements are included in the
preamble, but not in the codified regulation. 21 Moreover, the memorandum
directed agencies to employ preemption provisions in codified regulations
only to the extent "justified under legal principles governing
preemption,
'2
including the principles outlined in Executive Order 13132." 2
The Preemption Memorandum calls for agencies to "review regulations
issued within the past 10 years that contain statements in regulatory
preambles or codified provisions intended by the department or agency to

2009, available at http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication detail.asp?id=2084 (arguing that
the memorandum will have little impact on preemption beyond forcing agencies to conduct
"vague review" of regulations); Lauren Williamson, Agency Appraisal: President Obama Orders
Review of Federal Pre-emption Clauses, INSIDE COUNS. MAG., Aug. 2009, at 30 available at

http://www.insidecounsel.conm/VIssues/2009/August-2009/Pages/Agency-Appraisa.aspx

(noting

some commentators' arguments that the memorandum is a "purely political" move); see also
Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by FederalAgency
Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance That ProtectsPublic Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203,
1221 (2010) ("The memorandum does not fundamentally alter preemption principles or the
analysis undertaken.").
20. PreemptionMemorandum, supra note 18, at 24,693.
21. Id. ("Heads of departments and agencies should not include in regulatory preambles
statements that the department or agency intends to preempt State law through the regulation
except where preemption provisions are also included in the codified regulation.").
22. Id.
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preempt State law, in order to decide whether such statements or provisions
23
are justified under applicable legal principles governing preemption."
B. FederalismExecutive Order 13132

E.O. 13132, "Federalism," which President Clinton issued on August 4,
1999,21 is adverted to in Obama's Preemption Memorandum and also serves
as the centerpiece of numerous reform proposals for agency preemption of
state law. E.O. 13132 is an amended version of E.O. 12612, President
Reagan's Executive Order on Federalism. 25 E.O. 13132 identifies federalism
principles and policymaking criteria and designates specific procedures for
intergovernmental consultation. The Order designates special requirements
for agencies in taking action that preempts state law. It emphasizes consultations with state and local governments and enhanced sensitivity to their
concerns. And the Order applies to all federal agencies-except for independent regulatory agencies,26 which
are nonetheless encouraged to
2

comply voluntarily with its provisions.

1

1. Consultation Process
E.O. 13132 directs that agencies have "an accountable process to ensure
meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development
of regulatory policies that have federalism implications."2 The Order establishes specific procedures for intergovernmental consultation if a rule

23. Id.
24. Exec. Order No. 13,132,3 C.F.R. 206 (1999).
25. President Clinton had previously issued short-lived Executive Order 13083, a comprehensive rewrite of the Reagan Federalism Order. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 146
(1998). But E.O. 13083, which stated that federal action was justified "'[w]hen there is a need
for uniform national standards"; "[wihen decentralization increases the costs of government";
or "[w]hen States would be reluctant to impose necessary regulations because of fears that
regulated business activity will relocate to other States," id. § 3(d), 3 C.FR. at 148, was suspended after a "firestorm of criticism," including charges that President Clinton failed to
consult with state and local elected governmental officials, John Dinan, Strengthening the
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate of Recent Federalism Legislation in the U.S.
Congress, PUBLIUS, Summer 2004, at 55, 64. President Clinton issued E.O. 13132 after consulting with the "Big Seven" national organizations of state and local elected officials. See
Summary of Executive Order 13132 on FederalismIssued by Clinton Administration, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 31, 1999), http://web.archive.org/web/20051118212006/
http://www.ncsl.org/statefedlfederalism/exec13132.htm (describing "extensive negotiations
between the White House and seven national organizations ... representing state and local government officials").
26. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 207.
27. Id.§9,3C.F.R.at2ll.
28. Id. § 6(a), 3 C.ER. at 209. The Order defines "State and local officials" as "elected
officials of State and local governments or their representative national organizations." Id.
§ l(d), 3 C.ER. at 207.
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preempts state law. 29 Each agency must consult with state and local officials
"early in the process of developing the proposed regulation."3
2. Federalism Impact Statements
E.O. 13132 also requires agencies to provide a federalism impact statement ("FIS") whenever regulations will have federalism implications 31 and
preempt state law.3 2 Prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation, the
agency must provide OMB with a "federalism summary impact statement"
33
in "a separately identified portion of the preamble to the regulation.
The FIS must include (1) "a description of the extent of the agency's
prior consultation with State and local officials"; (2) "a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency's position supporting the need to issue
the regulation"; and (3) "a statement of the extent to which the concerns of
34
State and local officials have been met."
3. Enforcement
Within OMB, OIRA has "primary responsibility for implementing [E.O.
13132].1 35 In October, 1999, OIRA Administrator John Spotila circulated
"Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13132" to all heads of executive departments and agencies and to independent regulatory agencies. 36 The
guidelines are procedural in nature, focusing on "what agencies should do to
comply with the Order and how they should document that compliance to

OMB .3

29. Id. § 6(c), 3 C.ER. at 210 (establishing procedures for "any regulation that has
federalism implications and that preempts State law").
30. Id. § 6(c)(1), 3 C.ER. at 210.
31. Id. § l(a), 3 C.ER. at 206 (defining federalism implications as "substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on
the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government").
32. Id. § 6(c)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 210.
33. Id.
34. Id. The agency must also submit to OMB at that time a copy of any formal policyrelated correspondence from state and local officials. Id. § 6(c)(3), 3 C.ER. at 210.
35. See Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the
Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies & Indep. Regulatory Agencies: Guidance for Implementing
E.O. 13132, "Federalism" (Oct. 28, 1999) [hereinafter OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/mOO-02.pdf (cover
letter). As the OMB Guidance states: "Under Executive Order 12866, [OIRA] already coordinates our regulatory review and planning functions." Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.FR. 638 (1993) ("Regulatory Planning and Review"), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,422,
3 C.F.R. 191 (2007).
36. OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 1 (letter from John T. Spotila,
Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies & Indep.
Regulatory Agencies).
37.

Id.
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Pursuant to the guidelines, each agency and department designates a
federalism official with primary responsibility for the agency's implementation of the Order.38 Federalism officials are to (1) "ensure that the agency
considers federalism principles in its development of regulatory and legislative policies with federalism implications"; (2) "ensure that the agency has
an accountable process for meaningful and timely intergovernmental consultation in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism
39
implications"; and (3) "provide certification of compliance to OMB."
The federalism official must submit to OMB "a description of the agency's consultation process."40 The description "should indicate how the

agency identifies those policies with federalism implications and the procedures the agency will use to ensure meaningful and timely consultation with
affected State and local officials."'"

For any draft final regulation with federalism implications that is submitted for OIRA review under Executive Order 12866 ("E.O. 12866"), titled
"Regulatory Planning and Review' 42 the federalism official must certify that

the requirements of E.O. 13132 concerning both the evaluation of federalism policies and consultation have been met in a meaningful and timely
43

manner.

II. AGENCY

PRACTICE: RULEMAKING AND LITIGATION

The May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption caught federal
agencies' attention and prompted serious internal review, at least for the
majority of agencies surveyed.' Moreover, both the change in administration
and the Presidential Memorandum on Preemption have had wider-ranging
effects on preemption policy within the agencies. The policy shift, both in
38. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. at 209. Each agency was directed to
notify OIRA of its designated federalism official. OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note
35, at 2.
39. OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 2.
40. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. at 209; OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132,
supra note 35, at 2.
41. OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 5.
42. There are four criteria for regulations that trigger OMB review under E.O. 12866:
(1) have an annual effect on the economy of at least $100 million or adversely affect the economy in a "material" way; (2) create a "serious" inconsistency between the proposed action and
another federal agency action; (3) "[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements,
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof'; or (4)
"[r]aise novel legal or policy issues." Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641-42
(1993) (defining "significant regulatory action"), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3
C.F.R. 191 (2007).
43. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 8(a), 3 C.FR. at 209,
44. Officials at NHTSA, OCC, CPSC, and EPA provided me with either a report or
information regarding their respective agency's ten-year retrospective review of all rules intended to preempt state law. FDA did not provide this information; however, the agency
published its ten-year retrospective review while this Article was in production. Preemption
Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,565 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2011-10-05/html/2011-25479.htm.
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rulemakings and litigation positions, has been most pronounced at NHTSA
and CPSC, and more difficult to evaluate at FDA and OCC.

EPA stands apart. Preemption in EPA rules is relatively rare and always
occurs pursuant to express statutory provisions. Moreover, EPA has a unique
relationship with the states as coregulators.
A. NationalHighway Traffic Safety Administration

Of all the agencies surveyed, NHTSA's preemption policy shift under
the Obama Administration was the most dramatic.4 5 A June 2010 rule on
electric-powered vehicles contained a lengthy discussion of the evolution of
the agency's preemption approach, including its disavowal of the preemptive
language contained in three 2005 notices of proposed rulemaking;
("NPRMs") and, since 2007, its ever-weakening embrace of implied
preemption, as shown in its revisions to its boilerplate preemption language
in rulemakings. Beginning with its November 2010 proposed rule on child
restraint systems (and continuing to the present), NHTSA has further disclaimed any preemptive intent and affirmatively asserts that state tort law
may impose standards above and beyond
NHTSA's "minimum" safety
46
standards without creating any conflict.
In the midst of this period of NHTSA's refinement of its boilerplate
preemption language, in August 2010 the solicitor general submitted an
amicus brief (on behalf of NHTSA) to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.4 ' Arguing against preemption,

the solicitor general outlined a sharply circumscribed view of implied
preemption under Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., whereby NHTSA

safety standards should generally be read as minimum standards unless the
48
regulatory history demonstrates the agency's contrary affirmative policy.

45. I conducted extensive in-person interviews with NHTSA and DOT officials. Interview with Kevin Vincent, Chief Counsel, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., in
Washington, D.C. (June 30, 2010); Interview with Steve Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel, Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., in Washington, D.C. (June 30, 2010); Interview with Neil
Eisner, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Regulation & Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Transp., in
Washington, D.C. (June 30, 2010); Interview with Paul Geier, Assistant Gen. Counsel for
Litig., U.S. Dep't of Transp., in Washington, D.C. (July 6, 2010).
46. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Child Restraint Systems; Hybrid III 10Year-Old Child Test Dummy, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,648, 71,661 (proposed Nov. 24, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
47. No. 08-1314, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011).
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-31, Williamson, slip op. (No. 08-1314) [hereinafter U.S. Williamson Brief]. In Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held, notwithstanding the existence of an express
"savings" clause in the MVSA, that the statute and attendant NHTSA regulation governing
passive restraints in automobiles impliedly preempted a state tort lawsuit alleging that an automobile was defective because the manufacturer had not installed an airbag. 529 U.S. 861,
866, 873 (2000). The Court held that the tort lawsuit would interfere with the menu of options
offered by the regulation and, as such, would conflict with the "purposes and objectives" of
the federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 873, 881. Geier remains the seminal Court pronouncement on what is known as implied obstacle preemption.

February 20121

Inside Agency Preemption

The correspondence and feedback between the agency's litigating position
and its rulemaking considerations of preemption seemed to be stronger at
NHTSA than at any of the other agencies that I surveyed. Not only did
NHTSA's boilerplate language in its rulemakings since November 2010
mirror the government's articulated position in Williamson, but, of all the
agencies surveyed, NHTSA seemed the most cognizant of the link between
its rulemaking and the course of future tort litigation.

The agency's appreciation and assertion of its preemptive authority has
likewise evolved over time. In its June 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles
Rule, NHTSA characterized implied preemption under Geier as resting upon "finding implied preemption of State tort law on the basis of a conflict
discerned by the court, not on the basis of an intent to preempt asserted by

the agency itself."49 With its November 2010 Child Restraint Systems Rule,
NHTSA incorporated a bolder position on its own influence as part of its
revised boilerplate language: "The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the
likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation. '50 While this development has largely escaped commentary (from
NHTSA itself or from others), tort litigants have begun to take note."
1. Response to May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption
In response to the President's Memorandum on Preemption, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") sent OIRA a list of all current DOT
rulemakings asserting preemptive effect, along with what corrective action
would be taken, if any.5 2 For NHTSA, DOT identified six rules with
preemptive effect: Designated Seating Positions5

3

Air Bag Labeling,54

49. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,515, 33,525 (June 14, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (emphasis added).
50. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Child Restraint Systems; Hybrid III 10Year-Old Child Test Dummy, 75 Fed. Reg. at 71,661.
51. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 9, Priester v. Cromer, No. 06-CP-381071 (S.C. May 15, 2011) ("[l]n NHTSA's view ... a lawsuit like this one seeking to hold a
manufacturer liable for failing to install advanced glazing in the side windows of a passenger
vehicle would not be preempted by federal law."); id. at 18 ("NHTSA does not intend this rule
to preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle
manufacturers than that established by today's rule." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212, 3295 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pts. 571 & 585))).
52. Letter from Robert S. Rivkin, Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp., to
Kevin Neyland, Acting Adm'r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs (Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter
Letter from Robert S. Rivkin] (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
53. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions and Seat
Belt Assembly Anchorages, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,887 (Oct. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571).
54. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 66 Fed. Reg.
65,376 (Dec. 18, 2001) (to be codified at49 C.ER. pt. 571).
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Detachable Seat Belts, 55 Event Data Recorders, 56 and two Average Fuel
Economy Standards.57 Only one of these rules, the Designated Seating Positions Rule, was listed as including a preemptive provision in the codified
regulation.5 8 That rule is also the only rule for which NHTSA believed further action was warranted. NHTSA began with a list of only those notices
that either contained a statement that the agency intended to preempt tort
civil actions, or identified a specific factual situation in which such actions
would create a conflict or frustrate a federal purpose. It then removed those
notices whose statements had already been rendered inoperative by a subse59
quent notice.
NHTSA's identification of only six preemptive rules and just a single
one in need of further action may, at first glance, seem surprising in light of
the charges-from Congress, stakeholder groups, and legal academics-of
aggressive preemptive rulemaking during the George W. Bush Administration. According to the American Association for Justice's ("AAJ") 2008
Report, over the period from 2001 to 2008 NHTSA issued more notices
claiming preemption than any other federal agency, accounting for nearly
half of all rulemakings (twenty-four of fifty-three) that AAJ characterized as
preemptive rulemakings.60 Moreover, as of July 2010, AAJ compiled a list
of seven NHTSA proposed rules and seven final rules from 2005 to 2008
that it claimed "still contain preemption language. ' 61 By NHTSA's count,
only three of the twenty-four notices listed in AAJ's 2008 report, and none
of the fourteen notices listed in AAJ's July 2010 email, identified a conflict
or stated an intent to preempt, and thus the notices should not be characterized as "preemptive rulemakings." Two factors explain the discrepancy

55. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 69 Fed. Reg.
70,904 (Dec. 8, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585, 586, 589, 590, 596 & 597).
56. Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50,998 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 563).
57. Average Fuel Economy Standards, Passenger Cars and Light Trucks; Model Years
2011-2015, 73 Fed. Reg. 24,352 (proposed May 2, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523,
531. 533, 534, 536 & 537); Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years
2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533 &

537).
58. Letter from Robert S. Rivkin, supra note 52, at 7.
59. Email from Steve Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., to Catherine M. Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 13, 2010,
01:55 EST) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Email from Steve Wood].
60. AM. Ass'N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, app. B at 28-33. In my tally of preemptive
rulemakings, I grouped together as one all proposed, final, or amended rules on the same subject (which AAJ listed as separate entries). If either the proposed, final, or amended rule
claimed preemption, I counted it as a preemptive rulemaking (but not more than one). Note,
too, that the AAJ report listed proposed rules that had not yet resulted in a final (or interim
final) rule.
61. NHTSA Preemptive Regulations Issued from 2005-2008 Memorandum attached to
Email from Sarah Rooney, Regulatory Counsel, Am. Ass'n for Justice, to Catherine M.
Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y Univ. Sch. of Law (July 20, 2010, 15:31 EST) [hereinafter
Email from Sarah Rooney] (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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between NHTSA and AAJ. First, several rules that contained aggressive
assertions of preemption in the NPRMs did not contain preemption language in their final versions. Second-and the source of continuing
disagreement between NHTSA and AAJ-NHITSA did not include rules
that contain a "boilerplate" discussion of preemption.62 In its 2010 rulemaking on electric-powered vehicles, NHTSA responded to AAJ's charges of
further preemptive rulemakings by stating that the boilerplate language was
not intended to preempt state law because it did not include any finding of a
conflict and did not state any intent to preempt. The agency also provided
the history of the evolutionary changes it made to the language over time to
make the absence of conflict identification and of any preemptive statements
or intent increasingly clear.63 According to NHTSA, the boilerplate simply
describes the possibility that preemption could occur if there were an actual
conflict between state and federal law, as was the case in Geier, and no
more.' On NHTSA's account, the boilerplate makes no effort to identify or
serve as a warning of preemption but simply serves as a notice for potential
future conflicts in the courts. 65 Given that the Presidential Memorandum on
Preemption directs agencies to review all rules "intended by the department
or agency to preempt State law, ' 66 NHTSA concluded that the boilerplate
language did not fall within the memorandum and thus did not include for
review the rules with the boilerplate language.67

2. Rulemaking
NHTSA has acknowledged a policy shift on preemption under the
Obama Administration. At a congressional hearing in 2010 on proposed
amendments to the Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("MVSA"), NHTSA Administrator David Strickland made clear that the era of "preemption by preamble"
in rulemakings was over:
[REP. BRALEY:] All right. Now, one of the concerns that I had and many
people had during the period of the Bush Administration and its operation

62. Each of the rules on AAJ's July 2010 list from 2005 through 2008, see Email from
Sarah Rooney, supra note 61, contain such "boilerplate" language-with the exception of one
rule that seems to have been listed in error. AAJ lists the Windshield Zone Intrusion Rule, 73
Fed. Reg. 38,372 (July 7, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571), as asserting preemptive
effect. The rule, however, states that NHTSA tentatively concluded that states are free to regulate in this area and that the rule would not preempt state law. Id. at 38,373-74.
63. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,515, 33,524 (June 14, 2010) (to be

codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (stating that AAJ's discerning of preemptive intent in the boilerplate "fundamental[ly] misunderstand[s]" NHTSA's intent and noting that AAJ had not
pointed to any specific language that identified a conflict that could be the basis for preemption or that stated an intent to preempt).
64. Id. (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).

65.

Id.

66.

Preemption Memorandum, supra note 18, at 24,693 (emphasis added).

67.

Email from Steve Wood, supra note 59.
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of NHTSA was that the agency during that period specifically from 2005
to 2008 seemed to many of us to usurp its own regulatory authority and
take on the role of Congress by including in many of its preambles issued
in response to regulations language pre-empting state law claims. Are you
familiar with that practice?
[MR. STRICKLAND:] Yes, sir, I am.
[REP. BRALEY:] And I know that the President himself at the beginning
of his Administration took a strong position rolling back some of those
statements made by agency representatives in those preambles and in the
regulations themselves. Are you able here today as a representative of the
Administration... to assure us that those practices will not continue while
you are Administrator?
[MR. STRICKLAND:] I can make that obligation, absolutely. There is a notion that state's rights are incredibly important and those preambles that were
placed not only in NHTSA's rules but there were several rules throughout
executive branch agencies and safety agencies which undermine safety, and
I know the Obama Administration felt very strongly that those should not
be used to undercut the notion of safety whether by the federal government
or in the states. 68

NHTSA's clarifying actions in the preemption realm began in late summer 2008 (i.e., before the issuance of the May 20, 2009 Presidential
Memorandum on Preemption). 69 But only in its 2010 rulemaking on electric-powered vehicles did NHTSA provide an explicit description of the
evolution of changes it made in preemptive rulemakings. Recent revisions to
the boilerplate-including the agency's specific disavowal of preemptive
intent and explicit statement that "[e]stablishment of a higher standard by
means of State tort law would not conflict with the minimum standard proposed here"--have been introduced without any official commentary from
NHTSA.7 °
a. Removal of Preemptive Language

In three 2005 rulemakings-the Rearview Mirror Rule, the Roof Crush
Rule, and the Designated Seating Positions Rule-NHTSA gave an extended discussion of preemption and claimed the safety standard preempted state

68. Motor Vehicle Safety Act: Hearing on H.R. 5381 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 11 th
Cong. 62-63 (preliminary transcript of hearing) (2010). This sentiment was echoed by
NHTSA chief counsel, who maintained that "the 2005 policy is not the 2010 policy." Interview with Kevin Vincent, supra note 45.
69. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,524-25 (June 14, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.FR. pt. 571) (describing NHTSA's clarification efforts).
70. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection, 76 Fed. Reg.
52,883 (Aug. 24, 2011).
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tort law.7 For each of the 2005 proposed rulemakings, NHTSA identified a
potential conflict or obstacle posed by state tort law. In its 2010 rulemaking
on electric-powered vehicles, NHTSA noted that these earlier three 2005

NPRMs "contrast
markedly" with its other 2007-2008 rules that use boiler72
plate language.
i. Rearview MirrorRule
The 2005 NPRM for the Rearview Mirror Rule paradoxically asserted

preemption while disclaiming any federalism implications warranting consultation with state and local officials. This NPRM not only stated that the
proposed amendments "would preempt all state statutes, regulations and

common law requirements that differ with it," but also specifically named
New Jersey, New York, and Washington as states whose statutes would be
preempted under the rule.73 Despite this explicit, targeted preemption, the
NPRM asserted the rule "would not have sufficient Federalism implications
to warrant consultations with State and local officials or the preparation of a
74
Federalism summary impact statement."

Before the final rule was promulgated, Congress passed the Cameron
Gulbranson Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, which required
NHTSA to issue new rules expanding the driver's field of vision behind certain vehicles.7 5 The Act applied only to cars and light trucks, while
NHTSA's rule targeted heavier trucks.76 For that reason, and because postNPRM data and analysis indicated that the class of vehicles covered by the

NPRM accounted for only four of the annual deaths resulting from backover

71. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,753,
53,768-69 (proposed Sept. 12, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (rearview mirrors on
trucks); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223,
49,245-46 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (NPRM for roof
crush resistance); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions and
Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,094, 36,101-02 (proposed June 22, 2005)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (amending the definition of a "[d]esignated seating position" (emphasis omitted)).
72. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,524.
73. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 70 Fed, Reg. at 53,768
& nn.22-24 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-7 1.1 (West 2004); N.Y. VEH. & TiAF. LAW
§ 375(9)(e) (McKinney 2003); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.400 (West 2004)).
74. Id. at 53,768. NHTSA noted, however, that New York commented on the Advanced
NPRM, and NHTSA responded to New York's comments. Id. at 53,764-65, 53,768.
75. Cameron Gulbranson Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-189,
§ 2(b), 122 Stat. 639 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 30111).
76. See id. § 2(e)(2) (excluding from the Act motor vehicles weighing more than 10,000
pounds); 70 Fed. Reg. 53,753 (Sept. 12, 2005). Light trucks include sport utility vehicles and
vans (both passenger and cargo) under 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight rating ("GVWR");
NHTSA's rule applied to straight trucks with GVWRs between 10,000 and 26,000 pounds.
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accidents, NHTSA decided to withdraw the NPRM in order to take a "comprehensive look at backing safety for all types of motor vehicles."77
In March 2009, NHTSA issued a revised Advanced NPRM ("ANPRM")
for rearview mirrors.78 This revised ANPRM replaced the language discussing preemption with boilerplate language that stated there was a
"possibility" the MVSA would preempt state law, but NHTSA claimed that
it did not "know of any State laws or regulations that currently exist that are
potentially at risk of being preempted."7 9 For implied preemption, NHTSA
said it had "considered today's ANPRM and [did] not currently foresee any
potential State requirements that might conflict with it. Without any conflict,
there could not be any implied preemption."80 In its December 2010 NPRM,
NHTSA further disclaimed any preemptive intent in its revised boilerplate
language that stated, "NHTSA does not intend that this proposal preempt
state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by today's proposal."81
ii. Roof Crush Rule

In the NPRM for the Roof Crush Rule, NHTSA was clear that "if the
proposal were adopted as a final rule, it would preempt all conflicting State
common law requirements, including rules of tort law." 82 As it did in the
rearview mirror NPRM, NHTSA also asserted-paradoxically, given the
preemptive intent of the rule-that the new rule "would not have any substantial impact on the States" and therefore did "not have sufficient federal
implications to warrant consultation with State and local
officials or the
83
preparation of a federalism summary impact statement."
NHTSA received twenty-five comments in response to the preemption
discussion, including objections from National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"), Public Citizen, and twenty-seven state attorneys general.
During the comment period, Jeffrey Rosen, DOT General Counsel, and Steve Wood, a NHTSA attorney, met with representatives of NCSL and the
National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") at their request and
discussed the proposal and its preemptive effects. 84
77. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,309,
42,312 (withdrawal of rulemaking on July 21, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
78. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Rearview Mirrors, 74 Fed. Reg. 9478 (proposed Mar. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt 571).
79. Id. at 9516.
80. Id.
81. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186,
76,242 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 585).
82. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg.
49,223, 49,246 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
83. Id. at 49,245.
84. Jeffrey Rosen and Steve Wood met with NAAG and NCSL at a meeting at OMB.
Interview with Steve Wood, supra note 45.
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The Roof Crush Rule also caught Congress's attention. NHTSA's
preemptive rule was touched on during Congress's wide ranging 2007 hearing on regulatory preemption."5 Then, in 2008, the Senate held a hearing on
the Roof Crush Rule, during which it confronted NHTSA Deputy Administrator James Ports with questions about preemption. 86 Members from both
sides of the aisle criticized NHTSA. Republican Senator Coburn stated he
had "heartburn" over the lack of transparency in this rulemaking, and Demand
ocratic Senator Pryor warned NHTSA that preemption was a "bad idea"
7
that NHTSA was "overstepping its bounds" into the legislative arena.1
After the hearing, the Roof Crush Rule was shelved. Following the
change in administration, and just before the issuance of the Presidential
Memorandum on Preemption, NHTSA promulgated the final rule. The May
12, 2009 final rule "reconsidered" the tentative position presented in the
NPRM: "We do not foresee any potential State tort requirements that might
rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any
conflict with today's 8final
8
implied preemption.
iii. DesignatedSeating PositionsRule

The Designated Seating Positions Rule was the sole rule that NHTSA
identified in its response to the Presidential Memorandum on Preemption as
warranting further action. Subsequently, in a December 2009 final rule (in
for reconsideration), NHTSA removed the preemptive
response to petitions
89
text.
regulatory
The original final rule was issued in October 2008 and included
preemptive regulatory text. Both AAJ and Public Citizen petitioned NHTSA
to reconsider the 2008 rule. AAJ argued that neither express nor implied
preemption was warranted: express preemption was contrary to congressional
intent, and Geier was an "unusual, fact driven case" that upheld implied
preemption on the basis of the particular range of options intended to remain
available under the rule and on the basis of its lengthy regulatory history
that supported the agency's intent. 90 Public Citizen (with the Consumer
85. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and
State Authority?: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Regulatory Preemption] (statement of Donna Stone, State Rep., Delaware
General Assembly, Pres., NCSL). Representative Donna Stone, on behalf of NCSL, criticized
NHTSA for defying E.O. 13132 in its Roof Crush Rule by preempting state tort law in the
rule, while simultaneously disclaiming any federalism implications. Id. at 11.
86. Oversight Hearingon Roof Strength, supra note 2.
87. Id.
88. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,349 (May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.

pts. 571 & 585).
89. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions, 74 Fed.
Reg. 68,185, 68,189 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
90. Letter from Les Weisbrod, President, Am. Ass'n for Justice, to David Kelly,
Acting Admin., NHTSA (Nov. 24, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.govl#!
documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2008-0059-0008.
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Federation of America) argued that NHTSA's preemption statements were
"harmful and unnecessary," that tort law did not "frustrate" the purposes of
the rule, and that Geier was "fact-specific," and it disputed NHTSA's claims
that tort law would reduce safety by forcing automakers to install "more seat
belts than are necessary."91
After reconsideration and further analysis, NHTSA removed the
preemptive regulatory text in its December 2009 rule, stating that it agreed
with Public Citizen's argument that it was "unlikely" tort law would actually
conflict with the Designated Seating Positions Rule. 92 In making this determination, NHTSA researched state tort law and pending litigation and
consulted with organizations representing the interests of state and local
governments and officials. 93

NHTSA replaced the preemptive text in the preamble with boilerplate
language stating that while conflict preemption was theoretically possible,
NHTSA could discern no potential for a conflict. 94 The agency included a
lengthy explanation of "How NHTSA's Regulations May Give Rise to a
JudicialFinding of Preemption" 95 as well as a detailed explanation of how it
believed Geier should be interpreted. NHTSA's bottom line was that "[a]
court should not
find preemption too readily in the absence of clear evidence
96
of a conflict."

b. Evolution of Boilerplate Language on the Issue of Preemption

In most of its rulemakings in 2007 through 2008, NHTSA included a
boilerplate discussion of preemption indicating that state law could potentially conflict with the federal standard, but that NHTSA had not "outlined"
any conflicts at the present time.97 NHTSA's rulemakings from 2008 to 2010
included a variation on the boilerplate language.
In its 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles Rule, NHTSA described modifications in the boilerplate language from the 2007-2008 NPRMs up until
91. Letter from Joan Claybrook, President, Pub. Citizen, and Jack Gillis, Dir. of Pub.
Affairs, Consumer Fed'n of Am., to David Kelly, Acting Admin., NHTSA (Nov. 24, 2008)
(internal quotation mark omitted from first quotation), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2008-0059-0015.
92. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Designated Seating Positions, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 68,188-89.
93. Id. NHTSA engaged in this consultation outside of E.O. 13132, because it determined that the rule did not raise sufficient federalism implications to warrant a federalism
impact statement. Id. at 68,189. NCSL, which had actively opposed the Roof Crush Rule and
which took part in the notice-and-comment process, did not submit any comment on the Designated Seating Positions Rule.
94. Id. at 68,187-88.
95. Id. at 68,187 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 68,188.
97. See, e.g., WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER
No. 804, THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: REGULATORY PREEMPTION AT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 6 (2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/NHTSAPreemption_804.pdf.
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June 2010 as an ongoing attempt to clarify its position. 98 NHTSA examined
whether there was any potential to preempt and succinctly determined that

"[w]ithout any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption."99
Beginning with its November 2010 proposed Child Restraint Systems
Rule, NHTSA has gone even further to disclaim any preemptive intent in its
boilerplate language: "[NITSA] finds that this proposal, like many NHTSA
rules, prescribes only a minimum safety standard. As such, NHTSA does
not intend that this proposal preempt state tort law that would effectively
impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by today's proposal."'1
i. Implied PreemptionLanguage

In its 2008 NPRM on Seat Belt Lockability, the agency changed its language on implied preemption from "NHTSA has not outlined such potential
[conflicts]" to "NHTSA has not discerned any conflict."'' 1 The agency's
March 2009 Air Brakes Rule added language stating that "NHTSA has
considered today's interim final rule and does not currently foresee any
potential State requirements that might conflict with it. Without any conflict,
there could not be any implied preemption.' 0 2 According to NHTSA, this
revision was in response to AAJ's petitions to NHTSA.
In August 2009, NHTSA laid out how it assesses potential conflicts and
obstacles for implied preemption, while retaining the language about not
discerning any conflict. 0 3 The 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles Rule used
98. In subsequent rulemakings, NHTSA referred readers to the 2010 Electric-Powered
Vehicles Rule, which "explained that the agency has increasingly clarified and amplified its
discussion responding to E.O. 13132 in an attempt to end the misunderstandings and assuage
concerns about the preemption discussion." Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seat Belt
Assembly Anchorages, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, 75 Fed. Reg.
66,686, 66,695 (Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
99. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,515, 33,525-26 (June 14, 2010) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
100. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Child Restraint Systems; Hybrid III 10Year Old Child Test Dummy, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,648, 71,661 (proposed Nov. 24, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
101.
Compare Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection in
Interior Impact, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,900, 50,905 (Sept. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571), with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 73 Fed. Reg.
52,939, 52,941 (proposed Sept. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (emphasis added). At this time, NHTSA's language on express preemption remained unchanged. See Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 73 Fed. Reg. at 52,941.
102. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Air Brake Systems, 74 Fed. Reg. 9173,
9175 (Mar. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571), cited in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection,
75 Fed. Reg. at 33,525 & nn.26-27.
103. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Controls, Telltales, and Indicators, 74
Fed. Reg. 40,760, 40,763-64 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) ("However,
NTHSA has considered the nature and purpose of today's rule and does not currently foresee
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similar language, expanding slightly on NHTSA's conflict analysis:
"NHTSA has considered the nature (e.g., the language and structure of the
regulatory text) and objectives of today's final rule and does not discern any
existing State requirements that conflict with the rule or the potential for any
future State requirements that might conflict with it."'
NHTSA and AAJ continued to disagree over the interpretation of the
boilerplate language. 05 NHTSA argued that its inclusion of this boilerplate
discussion under the section of its preambles discussing E.O. 13132 was not
intended to preempt state tort law. AAJ disagreed. I identified twenty-nine
NHTSA rules with boilerplate language discussing preemption that NHTSA
did not include in its list to OIRA.' °6 These rules can be grouped into three
broad categories of NHTSA's evolving boilerplate. Eleven rules follow
NHTSA's tack (as seen in the June 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles Rule) of
stating that it cannot discern any conflict with state law and concluding that
"[w]ithout any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption."'' 07 Five
rules from 2008 state that NHTSA "cannot completely rule out the possibility that such a conflict might become apparent."'0 8 And eleven rules from
mid-2007 through mid-2008 state that while NHTSA had not identified a
conflict, a conflict-creating preemption was "conceivable."'0 9
With its November 2010 proposed Child Restraints Rule, NHTSA made
an even more emphatic disclaimer of preemptive intent or effect of its rulemaking as part of its further revised boilerplate. As a general matter,
NHTSA explained, conflicts between its federal safety standards and state
tort law should be few and far between: "Because most NHTSA standards
established by [Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards] are minimum
standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a
any potential [conflicts]. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption."
(emphasis added)).
104. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte
Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,525-26.
105. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages,
School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,686, 66,695 (Oct. 29,
2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) ("AAJ has mistakenly characterized the agency's
discussion of implied preemption, a discussion that we included in approximately two dozen
other Federal motor vehicle safety standard rulemaking notices issued from February 2007 to
November 2008.").
106. NHTSA reiterated its position that none of the notices in any of the categories identifies a conflict or states an intent to preempt and thus cannot be accurately characterized as a
"preemptive rulemaking." Email from Steve Wood, supra note 59.
107. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles; Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical Shock Protection, 75 Fed. Reg. at 33,524-26 (including the
most detailed discussion of boilerplate evolution).
108. E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seating Systems, Occupant Crash
Protection, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,744, 62,778 (Oct. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
109. E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, Partition,
and Roof Panel Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,331, 38,338 (July 7, 2008) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571).
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higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be
preempted."1 10 With respect to the specific proposal, NHTSA remarked that
it, "like many NHTSA rules, prescribes only a minimum safety standard....
Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not
conflict with the minimum standard proposed here.""' NITSA, moreover,
specifically stated that it "does not intend that this proposal preempt state
tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle
manufacturers than that established by today's proposal."' 12 And, for the first
time in a rulemaking, it made plain that "[t]he agency's ability to announce
its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the
likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.1'13

Unlike its long elaboration in the June 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles
Rule, NHTSA has not commented on this latest revision to its boilerplate
language on preemption, which it incorporated into its 2011 proposed rulemakings." 4 Although it should quell AAJ and Public Citizen's complaints
about the boilerplate language, the revision will likely subject NHTSA to
criticism for trying to disclaim the preemptive effect of its rules so emphatically.
ii. Express PreemptionLanguage
In addition to its evolving boilerplate discussion of implied preemption,
NHTSA altered its boilerplate language on express preemption under the
MVSA-although this latter change was not acknowledged or discussed by
NHTSA in its lengthy comments in the 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles
Rule. Throughout 2007 and 2008, as NHTSA altered the implied preemption boilerplate, the express preemption boilerplate's unqualified statement

110. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems; Hybrid II 10Year Old Child Test Dummy, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,648, 71,661 (proposed Nov. 24, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). NITSA did reserve a narrow category of rules where implied
preemption would be appropriate: "[If and when such a conflict does exist-for example,
when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard-the State common
law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted." Id. (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Make Inoperative Exemptions; Vehicle Modifications to Accommodate
People with Disabilities, Side Impact Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,025, 37,027 (June 24, 2011)
(to be codified at 49 C.ER. pt. 595); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Motorcycle
Helmets, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,132, 28,159 (May 13, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571);
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212, 3294-95 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 585).
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that the MVSA preempted "State law" that was not identical to the NHTSA
standard remained untouched.' 15
Then, in the March 2009 Air Brake Rule, NHTSA limited its claim of
express preemption to state positive law: "It is this statutory command [49
U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)] that unavoidably preempts State legislative and
administrative law, not today's rulemaking, so consultation would be unnecessary' " 6 The clear import is that state common law does not fall within
the purview of express preemption claims.117 NHTSA made this implication
explicit in its November 2010 proposed Child Restraint Systems Rule:
The express preemption provision .. . is subject to a savings clause under
which "[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt a person from liability at common law." Pursuant to this provision,
State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision
are generally preserved. 8

3. Litigation
NHTSA took an antipreemption position in Williamson v. Mazda Motor
of America, Inc., 1 9 the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case that defined the scope
of the Court's implied preemption holding in Geier. According to the solicitor general's amicus brief (submitted in August 2010), since Geier lower
courts around the country have misread the Supreme Court's holding and
rather have created a much broader standard of preemption in which they
find implied preemption "even though the federal agency that promulgated
and administers that regulation disagrees.' 12 The brief, signed by Paul
Geier, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation at DOT, argued that lower
courts have incorrectly read Geier to suggest that any time NHTSA gives
manufacturers different options to satisfy a safety standard, state tort law is
preempted. 121 Because of this broadening of Geier preemption, the brief

115. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 73
Fed. Reg. 52,939, 52,941 (proposed Sept. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 49 C.ER. pt. 571) ("It is
this statutory command [49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)] that preempts State law, not today's rulemaking, so consultation would be inappropriate.").
116. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard; Air Brake Systems, 74 Fed. Reg. 9173,
9175 (Mar. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (emphasis added).
117. According to Steve Wood, although he had not previously thought anyone would
reasonably read "state law" to include tort law-especially in light of Geier's holding of no
express preemption of state tort law-he decided to add qualifying language to ensure that no
one could henceforth interpret NHTSA's express preemption discussion as extending to tort
law. Email from Steve Wood, supra note 59.
118. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems; Hybrid In 10Year Old Child Test Dummy, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,648, 71,661 (proposed Nov. 24, 2010) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (alteration in original).
119. No. 08-1314, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011).
120. U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 17.
121. Id. at 17-18 (citing many federal and state cases).
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sought, like NHTSA's rulemaking shift,122 to clarify the "acknowledged confusion" and "widespread error in the lower courts over the decade since
23
Geier."1
The rule at issue in Williamson allowed manufacturers to choose between lap-belts and shoulder-belts for the middle seat position in cars.' 24
When the plaintiff sought to hold Mazda liable for its decision to use a lapbelt in its minivan, which contributed to the death of a passenger, Mazda
claimed, and the trial court agreed, that the claim was preempted by the
NHTSA safety standard. 125 Affirming the trial court, the California state appellate court held that the same policy concerns of testing multiple forms of
passive restraints (e.g., airbags) that led to preemption in Geier also applied
to seatbelts, and the California Supreme Court denied certiorari.' 26
The United States and NHTSA argued to the Court that, unlike in Geier,
there was no "affirmative[] encourag[ing]" of diverse forms of seatbelts, and
a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard should normally be read to be no
more than a "minimum standard.' ' 27 NHTSA appears to favor a standard
whereby courts should defer to its judgment when it states that a rule does
not have preemptive effect. Moreover, according to NHTSA, the agency's
"longstanding" position is that its standards do not generally preempt state
tort law, aside from situations in which the agency's affirmative policy presents an outright conflict, as in Geier.'2 8 The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held that the NHTSA regulation did not preempt state common
law and seven justices expressly endorsed the views of the agency and the
solicitor general, relying on "the regulation's history, the agency's contem' 29
poraneous explanation, and its consistently held interpretive views.'

122. Specifically, in NHTSA's December 2009 Designated Seating Positions Rule, the
agency set forth a similar interpretation of Geier. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Designated Seating Positions, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,185, 68,188 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
123. U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 21.
124. Williamson, slip op. at I.
125. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 4th 905, 907-10 (Ct. App.
2008) (describing trial court order), rev'd, No. 08-1314, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011).
126. Id. at 919; U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 6-8.
127. U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 9 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (2010)).
128. Indeed, NHTSA has consistently taken this position in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 30-31 (detailing the government's position set forth in a series of
amicus briefs submitted to the Court in cases dating back to 1990, including Wood v. General
Motors Corp., 494 U.S. 1065 (1990), and Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995)).
While this position stands in some tension with NHTSA's rulemaking during the period of use
of the preemption preambles in 2005 and arguably with some of the later rulemakings in
2007-2008, it is now squarely aligned with NHTSA's more recent rulemakings since November 2010. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
129. Williamson, slip op. at 12.
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B. Food and Drug Administration

Of the agencies surveyed, FDA is the most difficult to assess. Like
NHTSA, FDA came under sharp attack during the George W. Bush Administration for its efforts to preempt state tort law while skirting the
requirements of E.O. 13132.13° According to the AAJ study, from 2001 to
2008, FDA issued twenty of the fifty-three total notices issued by federal
agencies claiming preemption, second only to NHTSA.13 1 Most notably, the
FDA preempted state tort law for drug labeling through the preamble of a
regulation, even after it had previously disclaimed any preemptive intent in
the initial proposed rulemaking. 132 The U.S. Supreme Court criticized the
FDA's conduct in Wyeth v. Levine and refused to defer to the FDA's position
33
on preemption. 1
There is some evidence from the regulatory record and intervention in
litigation that indicates that FDA has revised its preemption policy under the
Obama Administration. My interview with FDA's chief counsel provided
some (albeit limited) evidence of a change in tone on preemption at the
agency, 3 4 Then-pending litigation-and FDA's attempts to keep its preemption position close to the vest until it had fully analyzed the issues-likely
explains the opacity of FDA's position.
Whereas NHTSA appears to have staked out a fairly categorical stance
rejecting implied obstacle preemption (at least with respect to state tort law)
in both its rulemaking and intervention in litigation, FDA seems to have
adopted a more neutral position, based on the fact-intensive nature of obstacle preemption that is likely to vary across different scenarios. FDA, for
example, removed all references to implied obstacle preemption in a recent
rulemaking on the ground that the doctrine is necessarily "case specific,"
whereas NHTSA, in its recent rulemakings, has incorporated what amounts
to an express disclaimer of preemptive intent or effect of its rules. Somewhat more subtly, differences can be teased out of the positions of the
respective agencies in litigation before the Supreme Court. Unlike the solicitor general's amicus brief in Williamson, which clearly articulated
NHTSA's antipreemption position in the case (and requested deference to
its views), the solicitor general did not take a similar opportunity to elabo130.

See, e.g., Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2131-41.

131.
132.

See AM. Ass'N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, app. B at 28-33.
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2131-34.

133. 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) ("In 2006, the agency finalized the rule and, without
offering States or other interested parties notice or opportunity for comment, articulated a
sweeping position on the FDCA's pre-emptive effect in the regulatory preamble. The agency's
views on state law are inherently suspect in light of this procedural failure."); Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2173-74 ("[T]he Court looked askance at the FDA's
'proclamations of pre-emption' in its 2006 preemption preamble. The Court specifically mentioned that the FDA's failure to 'offer[] States or other interested parties notice or opportunity
for comment' rendered its views on state law 'inherently suspect.'" (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted)).
134. Interview with Ralph Tyler, Chief Counsel, FDA, in Silver Spring, Md. (July 6,
2010).
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rate fully on FDA's general position on preemption in its amicus submission in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, a generic drug preemption case that same

term. 135
1. Response to May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption
In response to whether FDA conducted the ten-year retrospective review of preemptive rulemakings, FDA chief counsel stated that the agency

performed an extensive review, as requested by the Preemption Memorandum, and explained that FDA anticipates issuing the results of its review
after appropriate clearance. 136 Prospectively, the chief counsel explained

that "we seek to avoid finding preemption when we can in a principled
way."'

137

2. Rulemaking

Searches of recent FDA rulemakings did not turn up the kind of extensive commentary on an evolving position on preemption that NHTSA, for
example, included in its 2010 Electric-Powered Vehicles Rule. FDA, however, administers myriad statutory schemes (some of which include express

preemption provisions), and the agency therefore does not have the same
opportunity as does NHTSA to opine on preemption across the different
areas in which it regulates.
The rulemaking record, nonetheless, contains some hints that FDA may
have retreated from its aggressive propreemption stance. One example is the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's ("FDCA") non-prescription-drug express
preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. § 379r(a). While the prepublication version

of the FDA's over-the-counter ("OTC") labeling rule contained a preemption
provision (which was quickly removed from the Federal Register

135. Compare U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 29-31 (arguing that the Court
should defer to its position on preemption in addition to its interpretation of its regulations),
with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, PLIVA, Inc.
v. Mensing, No. 09-993, slip op. (U.S. June 23, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. Mensing Merits Brief]
(arguing for deference to FDA's interpretation of its regulations but not to its position on
preemption). Interestingly, the solicitor general also invoked the "presumption against
preemption" in Williamson, but not in Mensing. See U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note, 48, at
11.
136. Telephone Interview with Ralph Tyler, Chief Counsel, FDA; Ann Wion, Deputy
Chief Counsel for Program Review, FDA; and Leslie Kux, Acting Assistant Comm'r for Policy, FDA (Oct. 4, 2010). While this Article was in production, FDA published its ten-year
retrospective review of preemptive regulations. See supra note 44.
137.

Interview with Ralph Tyler, supra note 134.
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website), 38 the limited discussion of express preemption
in the final rule
39
does not preempt state law as clearly as the NPRM.1
On the other hand, FDA has continued to assert statutory preemption in
its rules-for example, the Skin Protectant and Bottled Water Rules. 14 0 The
Skin Protectant Rule, issued one month before the OTC Drug Labeling
Rule, likewise interprets preemption under § 379r(a).' n' The rule claims express preemption under 379r(a) with a justification similar to the NPRM in
the OTC Drug Labeling Rule, and also claims implied preemption under
out to state and local officials
Geier.'42 The rule mentions that FDA reached
43
on preemption but received no comment.
The Bottled Water Rule asserts preemption under a different provision
of the FDCA: preemption of misbranded food regulation in § 403A.' 4 The
rule quotes § 403A and explains:
Although this rule has a preemptive effect in that it will preclude States
from issuing requirements ... that are not identical to the requirements...

as set forth in this rule, this preemptive effect is consistent with what Congress set forth in section 403A of the act. Section 403A(a)(l) of the act
displaces both State legislative requirements and State common law duties. 45
The final rule actually appears to go further than the NPRM, which did
not assert that 403A(a)(1) preempted state common law duties. 146 As the
first FDA rule claiming preemption since President Obama's Preemption
138. Kurt R. Karst, Change in FDA Preemption Position? New Rule Largely Eliminates
PreemptionDiscussion, FDA L. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2009, 10:41 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
fda law blog-hyman-phelps/2009/04/change-in-fda-preemption-position-new-rule-largelyeliminates-preemption-discussion.html. 1 also interviewed Kurt Karst, author of FDA Law
Blog, by telephone on July 8, 2010.
139. See Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, and Antirheumatic Drug Products for Over-theCounter Human Use; Proposed Amendment of the Tentative Final Monograph; Required
Warnings and Other Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,314, 77,345 (proposed Dec. 26, 2006) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201 & 343).
140. See, e.g., Beverages: Bottled Water, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,651, 25,664 (May 29, 2009) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 129 & 165); Astringent Drug Products that Produce Aluminum
Acetate; Skin Protectant Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Technical Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. 9759, 9763-64 (Mar. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310 & 347).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 379r(a) (2006).
142. Astringent Drug Products that Produce Aluminum Acetate; Skin Protectant Drug
Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Technical Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. at 9763-64
(claiming express and implied preemption). The rule is a "technical amendment" that updates
a 1993 rule on skin protectants; there was no preemption provision in the 1993 rule. See Skin
Protectant Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Astringent Drug Products, 58
Fed. Reg. 54,458 (Oct. 21, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310 & 347).
143. Astringent Drug Products that Produce Aluminum Acetate; Skin Protectant Drug
Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Technical Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. at 9764.
144.
145.

See Beverages: Bottled Water, 74 Fed. Reg. at 25,664.
Id. (citation omitted).

146. See Beverages; Bottled Water, 73 Fed. Reg. 53,775, 53,791-92 (proposed Sept. 17,
2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 129 & 165).
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Memorandum, however, the rule states that it is now treating preemption "in
light of the President's Memorandum."' 47
FDA appears to rely exclusively on express preemption principles, with
no reliance on Geier implied preemption. Guided by this approach, in a
2011 Sunscreen Drug Products Rule, FDA removed statements regarding
implied preemption that it had included in the 2007 proposed rule. As FDA
explained: "[W]e have omitted any statement regarding implied preemption
preemption may arise, such scenarios are necesbecause, although implied
48
sarily case-specific.'
3. Litigation
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, which
held that state law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers were preempted, notwithstanding the Court's refusal in Wyeth v. Levine
to preempt similar claims against brand name prescription drug companies.' 49 The Court held that the federal regulations applicable to generic drug
manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus preempt, state law failure-towarn claims. 150
In its amicus briefs to the Court,' 5 ' the solicitor general (joined by agency officials from the Department of Health and Human Services 52 ) argued
against preemption of the state tort claim. FDA conceded that generic drug
manufacturers are constrained in their ability to alter their labels, which by
147. Beverages; Bottled Water, 74 Fed. Reg. at 25,664'n.3.
148. Labeling and Effectiveness Testing; Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter
Human Use, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,620, 35,624 (June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201
& 310).
149. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993, slip op. (U.S. June 23, 2011). The precise
question presented in Mensing was "[w]hether the [court] abrogated the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments by allowing state tort liability for failure to warn in direct contravention of the
Act's requirement that a generic drug's labeling be the same as the FDA-approved labeling for
the listed (or branded) drug." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mensing, slip op. (No. 09993), available at http:/www.scotusblog.com/wp-contentuploads/2010105/09-993-pet.pdf.
Both of the federal courts of appeals (and the majority of lower federal courts) that addressed the issue rejected preemption. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010),
rev'd, Mensing, slip op. at 6, reh'g denied, remand to, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 650 F.3d 1045
(5th Cir.); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), rev'd, Mensing, slip op. at 6,
remand to, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 650 F.3d 1045 (5th Cir.).
150. Until 1984, the same federal regulations applied to both brand name and generic
drugs. In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which streamlined requirements for generic drug manufacturers to gain FDA approval simply by showing the
generic's equivalence (including active ingredients as well as labeling) to the brand name
drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006).
151. Before granting certiorari, the Court requested the views of the solicitor general on
the petition for writ of certiorari. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Mensing,
slip op. (No. 09-993) [hereinafter U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief]. The solicitor general also filed an
amicus brief at the merits stage. U.S. Mensing Merits Brief, supra note 135.
152. Ralph Tyler, Chief Counsel of FDA, signed the briefs in his capacity as Associate
General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services. U.S. Mensing Merits
Brief, supra note 135; U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151.
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statutory mandate must be identical to those approved for the brand name
drug.'53 Unlike a brand name manufacturer, a generic drug manufacturer cannot unilaterally change its approved labeling under the "changes being
effected" ("CBE") process. 154 Moreover, should a generic drug manufacturer
unilaterally send out a "Dear Health Care Professional" letter (as brand
name drug manufacturers may do), 155 it risks having its generic drug deemed
"misbranded."' 5 6 Nonetheless, FDA maintained that generic drug manufacturers are obliged to provide FDA with any new information about risks and
may do so by proposing either labeling changes or "Dear Health Care Professional" letters to FDA, which can then modify the existing warnings as
appropriate."'

The Supreme Court deferred to FDA's interpretations of its regulations,
finding its views "'controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation s]' or there is any other reason to doubt that they reflect the
FDA's fair and considered judgment."' 58 But the Court disagreed with FDA's

153. U.S. Mensing Merits Brief, supra note 135, at 3, 15-16 (stating that generic drugs
must bear labeling "the same as the labeling approved for the [name brand drug]" (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154. Id. at 7, 16 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("FDA has consistently taken the position that [a generic drug manufacturer] may not unilaterally change its
approved labeling."). The Eighth Circuit did not weigh in on this issue in Mensing. The Fifth
Circuit, however, concluded that the CBE process was available to generic drug manufacturers. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 439-44. According to the solicitor general, the Fifth Circuit's
holding "misunderstands FDA's regulations." U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151, at 22
n.10.
155. These letters describe important information about a drug, including updated warnings, and are occasionally mailed out by drug manufacturers and distributors to physicians,
nurses, and other members of the professional health care community. See 21 C.F.R. § 200.5
(2011) (setting standards for such correspondence).
156. For this reason, "[sitate law may not impose liability on [a generic drug manufacturer] for failing to send such a letter unilaterally." U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151,
at 18.
157. See id. ("[E]ither would have involved bringing the relevant information to FDA's
attention with a view to providing consistent warnings for the [brand name drug] and its generic equivalents.'); id. at 13 ("[Generic drug manufacturers] were nonetheless required to
provide FDA with new information about risks, and FDA would have acted on such information if appropriate... "); id. at 15 (declaring that generic drug manufacturers are
"obligated to provide FDA with information about labeling concerns"); see also U.S. Mensing
Merits Brief, supra note 135, at 9.
158. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 23, 2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997)); see id. at 8 ("We defer to
the FDA's interpretation of its CBE and generic labeling regulations."); id. ("As with the CBE
regulation, we defer to the FDA [regarding generic drug manufacturer's ability to send 'Dear
Health Care Professional' letters]"). The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether, as the
FDA claimed, a preamble to its regulations implementing the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
created a federal duty for generic manufacturers, in light of new safety risk information, to
request that FDA take steps to strengthen the label for both brand-name and generic drugs. Id.
at 10 ("Because we ultimately find pre-emption even assuming such a duty existed, we do not
resolve the matter.").
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bottom-line conclusion that state law was not preempted. 59 Instead, the
Court found "impossibility" preemption on the ground that the generic drug
manufacturers could not simultaneously satisfy their state law duty to provide additional warnings and their federal law duty to provide the same
labeling as the brand name drug. 160 Moreover, the Court widened the scope
of impossibility preemption by refusing to take into account possible
interventions by FDA to reconcile federal and state law duties.'61
The solicitor general's amicus briefs in Mensing are FDA's first expression of its position on implied preemption under the Obama Administration.
FDA claims that its interpretations of its regulations governing drug labeling
are entitled to deference. 162 Perhaps of even greater significance, and despite

its opposition to the generic drug manufacturers' impossibility preemption
argument, FDA would nonetheless preserve its own potential preemptive
authority: "A fully informed, actual decision by FDA that a particular warning would be inconsistent with the FDCA or FDA's regulations would

presumably preempt a state law claim predicated on the necessity of such a
warning.'1 63 On FDA's account, the key to the implied preemption
159. Id. at 6-7 n.3 ("Although we defer to the agency's interpretation of its regulations,
we do not defer to an agency's ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be preempted" (citation omitted)). The Court's treatment here of the agency's position contrasts
with its heavy reliance in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc. on "the promulgating agency's contemporaneous explanation of its objectives, and the agency's current views of the
regulation's pre-emptive effect." No. 08-1314, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011). Justice
Thomas was the lone objector to the agency-centric view espoused by the majority in Williamson; writing for the Court in Mensing, he steered the majority toward a more limited and
structured approach, focusing on the text of the relevant federal regulations (as interpreted by
FDA). Mensing may signal a backpedaling from the Williamson approach to agency deference
on preemption; however, it may be distinguishable given that it was resolved solely on implied
impossibility preemption and thus did not consider the wider obstacle (or frustration of purposes) preemption. See Mensing, slip op. at 18 n.7 ("[Tihat type of pre-emption [obstacle] is
not argued here."). In that regard, the Court's analysis in Mensing shares more affinities with
express preemption cases-where the Court's task is to interpret the language of the explicit
preemption provision-than with implied obstacle preemption cases, which require resort to
extratextual sources, chief among them the agency's stated objectives, regulatory record, and
views on preemption.
160. Mensing, slip op. at 12 ("[Ilt was impossible for the Manufacturers to comply with
both their state-law duty to change the label and their federal law duty to keep the label the
same.").
161. See id. at 13 ("The question for 'impossibility' is whether the private party could
independently do under federal law what state law requires of it." (emphasis added)); id. at 17
("[W]hen a party cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government's special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency,
that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties for preemption purposes."). The
dissent vehemently objected to this "independent" requirement, charging that the majority
"invents new principles of pre-emption law out of thin air to justify its dilution of the impossibility standard." Id. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
162. U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151, at 13 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 462 (1997), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984)).
163. Id. at 19 n.9 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1203 & n.14 (2009)); see
also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring); U.S. Mensing

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:521

determination (and a factual issue that must be addressed in the litigation) is
"what action FDA would have taken in response to a hypothetical warning
proposal";' 64 and here, FDA argues that the drug manufacturers will have to
continue to shoulder the preemption
defense burden by demonstrating "the
1 65
likelihood of FDA inaction.

FDA likewise signaled (in its amicus brief at the certiorari petition
stage) that the scope of obstacle (i.e., frustration of purposes) preemption
was narrow. 166 First, FDA reiterated the Levine Court's characterization of
the proconsumer purpose of the FDCA to "bolster consumer protection
against harmful products," which it said reflected Congress's "determin[ation] that widely available state rights of action provide[] appropriate
[compensatory] relief for injured consumers."' 67 Next, FDA reasoned that it
would not make sense for Congress to have deprived consumers injured by
generic drugs of state law remedies against the manufacturer while similarly
68
situated consumers injured by brand name drugs would have recourse. If
Congress had actually intended to do so, FDA argued, it "surely would have
enacted an express preemption provision if it believed that all state-law suits
posed an obstacle to its objectives."'69 Finally, FDA concluded that the mod-

Merits Brief, supra note 135, at 32 ("If FDA had actually rejected a labeling change proposed
by [a generic drug manufacturer] ...[that] might well operate to bar a jury from revisiting
FDA's decision.").
164. U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151, at 19.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It remains elusive precisely what kind of
evidence would suffice to indicate that FDA considered the new risk information but declined
to take further action to alter the labeling, and thus preempt a state failure-to-warn claim. FDA
nonetheless takes the position that such clashes, wherein it is impossible for the defendant
manufacturer to comply with both the state law duty and the federal regulatory requirements,
"arise infrequently, and when they do, there tend to be unique, fact-specific considerations at
issue." Id. at 16.
166. At the merits stage, the generic drug manufacturers abandoned their obstacle
preemption argument. See Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy at 48,
Mensing, slip op. (No. 09-993) ("[Petitioners] appear to have largely abandoned [the argument
that state tort liability would obstruct Congress's purposes and objectives in enacting the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments]."). Thus, the government omitted its obstacle preemption argument from its merits-stage amicus brief. The government nonetheless briefly mentioned
obstacle preemption, citing Williamson and Levine but not further elaborating on its position:
"Even if compliance with both state and federal law is not impossible, the state-law duty underlying a tort claim is preempted if it would frustrate the purposes and objectives of federal
statutes and regulations." U.S. Mensing Merits Brief, supra note 135, at 14 (citing Williamson
v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., No. 08-1314, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2011), and Levine, 129
S. Ct. at 1199).
167. U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151, at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. Mensing Merits Brief,
supra note 135, at 28.
168. U.S. Mensing Cert. Brief, supra note 151, at 21.
169. Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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est state law duty to provide information to FDA "seems unlikely to affect
the availability of generic pharnaceuticals."' 70
Overall, however, FDA's position on implied obstacle preemption in the
certiorari-stage amicus brief is cursory, and FDA does not request deference
to its antipreemption position (as NHTSA did in Williamson"1 t ). And because obstacle preemption dropped out of the case altogether, FDA had no
further opportunity to elaborate.
C. Office of the Comptrollerof the Currency
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered OCC's preemptive rulemakings
on a number of occasions. In Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, the Court
held that the National Banking Act ("NBA") does not preempt a state attorney general's action to enforce consumer protection laws preventing
discriminatory or predatory lending against a national bank. 172 More specifically, the Court considered whether OCC's Visitorial Powers Rule, which
preempted state law enforcement, 173 was a reasonable interpretation of the
NBA, which shields national banks from states' exercises of "[v]isitorial
powers.'"' 74 The Court rejected OCC's position as contrary to the plain terms
of the NBA, which would permit state enforcement of nonpreempted state
law. 75 OCC had wielded the same Visitorial Powers Rule to preempt state
laws regulating mortgage lending as applied to state-chartered subsidiaries
Supreme Court upheld two years earlier
of national banks, an action that the
76
in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 1
OCC's preemptive Visitorial Powers Rule was issued in 2004, along
with a broader rule preempting all state laws that "'obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized
powers' in four broadly-defined areas-real estate lending, lending not
170. Id. at 22. At the same time, FDA recognized that "imposing on a generic manufacturer a state law duty not to market its product without developing for itself knowledge as
comprehensive as FDA's or the [brand name manufacturer's] could pose [different] preemption questions." Id.
171.
See U.S. Williamson Brief, supra note 48, at 29-31.
172. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2011). The exercise of visitorial powers is the power to
inspect or make decisions about an entity's operations. Id.
174.
12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
175. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715. The Court did, however, conclude that state attorneys general cannot investigate national banks' conduct or practices using administrative
subpoenas, which the Court characterized as impermissible visitations preempted by the NBA.
Id. at 2721-22.
176. 550 U.S. 1 (2007). Unlike Cuomo, which focused on the scope of express preemption inherent in the statutory term "visitorial powers," the Court found implied conflict
preemption in Watters, holding that state supervision of state-chartered subsidiaries of national
banks would conflict with the exercise of the national bank's federally authorized powers
under the NBA. Warters, 550 U.S. at 20-21. But see infra note 209 and accompanying text
(discussing how Congress overturned Watters in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act).
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secured by real estate, deposit-taking, and other 'operations.' ",177 When
OCC considered these rules, members of Congress wrote to OCC to ask for
a delay in promulgating these rules, because they wanted to consider whether to clarify congressional intent to OCC after Congress returned from
recess.178 OCC did not wait. In response, both the House and Senate comOCC's actions exceeded the
mittees conducted hearings on whether
179
boundaries of what Congress intended.
Additionally, Congress commissioned GAO to study OCC's rulemaking
process, to review OCC's capacity to handle consumer complaints, and to
assess the potential impact of OCC's rules on consumer protection and the
dual banking system. 180 The 2005 GAO Report evaluated OCC's apparent
disregard of state interests in passing the preemptive rules at issue in Cuomo
and Watters, and concluded that OCC had opportunities to enhance its consultative efforts. 18" ' Because GAO found that OCC had followed the
requirements of E.O. 13132, GAO did not make formal recommendations to
Congress. 182 GAO cautioned, however, that it "could not fully determine the
basis for some of the other agency actions or assess the extent of its consultations with stakeholders because OCC did not always document its actions
and lacked written guidance and procedures detailing the rulemaking
process."'' 83 GAO criticized OCC's lack of documentation of both its consultations and procedures, warning that "[w]ithout such documentation, it may not
177. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to
the Subprime FinancialCrisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR REFORM 295, 335 n.89 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) (citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-.4009, 34.4).
178. See CongressionalReview of OCC Preemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 274-89 (2004)
(letters from various members of Congress to Hon. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the

Currency).
179. See id.; Review of the National Bank Preemption Rules: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 864 (2004).
180. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, OCC PREEMPTION RULES:
OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION

LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS 2 (2006), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf.

181.

The Report stated:

In the face of an executive order [13132] specifically calling for state and local consultation on preemption rules, OCC's limited additional effort may have contributed to an
impression that it did not genuinely seek or consider input from [state bank supervisors].
Stakeholders representing such diverse interests as consumer protection advocates, state
bank regulators, state attorneys general, and some Members of Congress continue to
maintain that the agency did not genuinely seek their input.
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-8, OCC PREEMPTION RULEMAKING: OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED TO ENHANCE THE CONSULTATIVE EFFORTS AND BETTER DOCUMENT THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS 45 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 GAO REPORT], available at http://

www.gao.gov/new.items/d068.pdf.

182.
183.

Id. at "Highlights."
Id. at5.
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be clear-to agency management, auditors, or oversight committees-that an
agency followed applicable requirements."' 4
From the perspective of OCC officials, 185 preemption is a "tool for conducting nationwide business.' 86 Others have made the point more
pejoratively, claiming that preemption is a "selling point" used by OCC to
market charters. Competing with state banking charters, OCC has used
preemption as an inducement to persuade banks to incorporate under national charters, thereby increasing its revenues and its budget. 8 7 Assessment
fees collected from nationally chartered banks are OCC's primary source of
revenue. 8 8 Congress believed that because OCC admitted that preemption
was about attracting additional charters, which in turn increased the size of
89
OCC's budget, reform was needed.1
Largely overshadowing any developments in the rulemaking or litigation
realms at OCC is the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act" or "the Act"). Pursuant to this Act, OCC

184. Id.; see also id. at 46 ("Without documentation about matters such as how decisions
were reached, who was consulted, and what their views were, we were not able to present
information in this report that might have contributed to a better understanding of OCC's process.").
185. I conducted a telephone interview with a group of OCC officials on August 5, 2010.
Participants in the telephone interview were: Horace Sneed, Director of the Litigation Division; Karen Solomon, Director of the Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division; Michele
Meyer, Assistant Director of the Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division; Ursula Bass,
Counsel in the Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division; and Douglas Jordan, Senior
Counsel in the Litigation Division. Telephone Interview with Horace Sneed, Dir. of Litig.
Div., OCC; Karen Solomon, Dir., Legislative & Regulatory Activities Div., OCC; Michele
Meyer, Assistant Dir., Legislative & Regulatory Activities Div., OCC; Ursula Bass, Counsel,
Legislative & Regulatory Activities Div.; and Douglas Jordan, Senior Counsel, Litig. Div.,
OCC (Aug. 5, 2010) [hereinafter OCC Telephone Interview].
186. Id.
187. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 177, at 308 ("A former head of the OCC described
preemption as 'a significant benefit of the national [bank] charter-a benefit that the OCC has
fought hard over the years to preserve.'" (alteration in original) (quoting John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in Housing and Finance (Feb. 12,
2002))).
188. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
93 (2008) ("Assessments compromise 95% of the OCC's budget... ").
189. S. COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. No. 111-176, at 16 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.govl
fdsys/pkg/CRPT- 11 lsrptl76/pdf/CRPT- 11 lsrptl76.pdf ("At a hearing on the OCC's preemption rule, Comptroller Hawke acknowledged, in response to questioning from Senator
Sarbanes, that one reason Hawke issued the preemption rule was to attract additional charters,
which helps to bolster the budget of the OCC"). In the hearing that the Senate Report cites,
Comptroller Hawke, responding to Senator Sarbanes, stated: "[P]reemption is an important
attribute of the national bank charter, and I am a strong believer in the quality of the national
bank charter." Review of the NationalBank PreemptionRules: HearingsBefore the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 37 (2004) (statement of John D. Hawke,
Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury) (discussing Jess Bravin & Paul
Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers,
WALL ST.

J., Jan. 28, 2002, at Al).
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is classified as an independent agency, no longer subject to the mandates of
E.O. 13132.190
1. Congressional Response: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act
Legislative activity has dominated preemption policy developments at
OCC over rulemaking and litigation efforts. 19 ' Under the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Act,'92 OCC is designated as an independent regulatory agency within the
Department of the Treasury, and assumes the functions of the Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS") relating to federal savings associations and the
OTS's rulemaking authority for all savings associations. 193 The Act also creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to promulgate and enforce
federal financial consumer protection laws. 94 For financial consumer protection, Congress inserted a general preemption standard provision that
mirrors the provisions in some of the Federal Trade Commission acts: federal law sets a floor, state law that extends beyond federal law should not be
preempted, 195 and state law that is "inconsistent" with federal law is only
preempted to the extent of the inconsistency.'96 The Bureau has the authority
to determine whether state law is inconsistent
with federal law, either on its
97
own motion or in response to a petition. 1
In the Act's highly contentious "Barnett paragraph," Congress set forth
the preemption standard for how state consumer financial protection laws
apply to national banks. A state consumer law is preempted only if: (1) it
discriminates against national banks; 19 8 (2) in accordance with Barnett Bank
v. Nelson,199 it "prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the

national bank of its powers"; 200 or (3) it is preempted by another federal law.
190. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 315, 124 Stat. 1376, 1524 (2010) (amending the definition of "independent regulatory
agency" 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006), to include OCC); see also OCC Telephone Interview,
supra note 185 (confirming change).
191. OCC deferred revisiting its Visitorial Powers Rule until the conclusion of the legislative process. See infra note 215.
192. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
193. Id. §§ 312(b)(2)(B), 314.
194. Id. § 1011. The Bureau is likewise an independent regulatory agency, and therefore
is not subject to E.O. 13132. Id. § 1100D(a).
195. Id. § 1041(a)(2).
196. Id. § 1041(a)(1).
197. Id. § 1041(a)(2).
198. Id. § 1044(a) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(1)(A)).
199. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
200. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (emphasis
added) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(1)(B)). The final bill added the language "significantly
interferes," as opposed to merely citing Barnett.Id. There is a debate over whether OCC, over
the past decade, has gone further than the original Barnett standard in its preemption determinations and whether the Act changes the substantive preemption standard. Compare Stacy
Kaper & Cheyenne Hopkins, Regulatory Reform Conferees Clip Preemption, AM. BANKER,
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557

Preemption determinations under the Barnett standard can be made by courts

or by regulation or order of OCC "on a case-by-case basis.120' "Case-by-case
basis" is defined as evaluating one specific state law at a time, rather than affording blanket preemption. 20 2 0CC may attempt to preempt more than one
state's law at a time if it determines that the laws of multiple states are

"substantively equivalent," but OCC must consult with the Bureau when
203
determining whether state law is "substantively equivalent."

According to OCC officials, the Barnett paragraph does not alter the
status quo because OCC's preemptive rulemakings have explicitly cited
Barnett.2°4 Nor, in their opinion, does the "case-by-case basis" language
exclude categorical preemptive rulemakings because of the "substantively

equivalent" provision. 20 5 But portions of the Act's legislative history,
including key commentators, suggest that OCC was stripped of authority to
enact blanket preemption provisions.2"°
That said, the "case-by-case" provision applies only to "[sitate consumer
financial law[s]," which are narrowly defined as "State law[s] that do[] not
directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and that directly
and specifically regulate[] the manner, content, or terms and conditions of

any financial transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage
in), or any account related thereto, with respect to a consumer."2 7 Thus,

June 23, 2010 (quoting various scholars and commentators as stating that Barnett's "signifi-

cantly interferes" standard is higher than the mere "obstructs" or "impairs" standard used by
OCC in its 2004 rulemakings), with New FinancialRegulatory Reform Act: Has It Materially
Altered the Preemption Landscapefor Federally Chartered Institutions?, FIN. REG. REFORM
ADVISORY (Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.), July 2010, at 4 [hereinafter New
Financial Regulatory Reform Act], available at http:/lwww.aporter.net/public-document.

cfm?u=NewFinancialRegulatoryReformActHasitMateriallyAlteredthePreemptionLandscapefor
FederallyCharteredlnstitutions&id=16154&key=6E2 (stating Barnett standard's impact on
national banks "will to some extent be limited by the fact that the.., amendments primarily codify existing precedent," but will greatly affect the standards for thrifts and savings
banks as it moves away from OTS's "field preemption" standard).
201. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (adding 12
U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(1)(B)).
202. See id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(3)(A)).
203. Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(3)(B)).
204. OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185. But see supra note 200 (presenting
debate on this issue).
205. OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.
206. The Act's legislative history suggests that the "case-by-case" provision was a compromise provision that gave OCC some preemptive power, whereas earlier versions of the bill
would have stripped OCC of preemptive power entirely. See 156 CONG. REC. H14,678 (daily
ed. Dec. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. Melissa Bean). Moreover, former OCC Comptroller
John Hawke is listed as a contact on a client report on the Dodd-Frank Act for his law firm,
Arnold & Porter, which states that preemption of state consumer financial laws by OCC "must
be made on a 'case-by-case' basis." New Financial Regulatory Reform Act, supra note 200, at
2-3.

207. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(a)(2)).
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preemption of state laws regulating
issues like bank registration would not
20
be subject to this provision.
Congress also included a savings clause in the Act, which reverses
Watters v. Wachovia with respect to the 2applicability
of state law to
9
0
banks.
national
of
subsidiaries
state-chartered
Finally, OCC must conduct a periodic review (through notice-andcomment rulemaking proceedings) of any regulations or orders with
21
preemptive effect every five years after promulgating such a regulation. 1
This list must be forwarded to both the House Committee on Financial
Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 211 Given OCC's new designation as an independent regulatory agency,
the Dodd-Frank Act shifts review of OCC rulemaking from the executive to
Congress. OCC is also required to publish and
update quarterly a list of all
212
agency determinations with preemptive effect.
2. Response to May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption
OCC's law department conducted a review of its preemptive rulemaking
and submitted it to OIRA in August 2009.213 OCC identified eight preemptive rulemakings since 1999 and concluded that, with one exception, all
were "justified under the established legal principles that govern national
bank preemption, including the principles in E.O. 13132."214 0CC deemed
the one exception-the
Visitorial Powers Rule-in need of further revision
21 5
in light of Cuomo.
With respect to compliance with E.O. 13132, OCC stated:
OCC complied with the principles and requirements of E.O. 13132 in
promulgating each of the 8 preemption rules ....Each rule was issued using the notice-and-comment procedures prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act. We received detailed and thoughtful comments from state
officials individually and collectively on many of the proposals and, in
some cases, we met with state representatives to discuss them. We considered those comments fully, and summarized and responded to them in the
208.

New FinancialRegulatory Reform Act, supra note 200, at 2.

209. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (adding 12 U.S.C. §§ 5136C(b)(2), 5136C(e)).
210. Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(d)(1)).
211. Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(d)(2)).
212. Id. (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(g) ("Transparency of OCC Preemption Determinations")).

213. See Memorandum from Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and
Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Kevin F. Neyland, Deputy Adm'r,
Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, 2-3 (Aug. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Williams Memorandum to Neyland] (on file with the Michigan Law Review).

214. Id. at 1.
215. Id. ("We are currently preparing revisions to that regulation to conform with the
Court's decision in Cuomo."). According to OCC officials, OCC determined that, prior to
undertaking revisions to rules, it would await the end of the legislative process (which culminated in the Dodd-Frank Act). OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.
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preambles to the final rules. We prepared and published with each final
rule a federalism summary impact statement specific to that rule. The
preambles to those rules, including the federalism summary impact statements, demonstrate the OCC's adherence to the applicable constitutional
and legal principles, detail the comments and concerns submitted by state
16
and local officials, and provide the OCC's response to those comments.1

OCC's response to the Preemption Memorandum was comprehensive. In
light of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, an additional rule-the Bank Operations Rule-may warrant revisiting. The rule adopts a loose interpretation of
the Barnett standard for preempting state law. Under that standard, state
laws are deemed preempted if they "interfere with or impair" a national
bank's ability to perform certain acts. The Bank Operations Rule omits the
"significantly interferes" language from the standard for conflict preemption.217 Thus, although OCC claims in the review it submitted to OIRA that
the preemption standard used in the Bank Operations Rule was "confirmed"
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of banking preemption in Watters,2" 8
OCC's interpretation of Barnett may not be appropriate in light of Congress's reiteration of the "significantly interferes" language as part of the
Barnett standard in the Dodd-Frank Act.
3. Rulemaking
OCC issued a final rule to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,
including revisions to OCC's rules on preemption and its Visitorial Powers
Rule. In its May 2011 NPRM, OCC asserted-consistently with the views
expressed earlier by OCC officials 219 -that the Act did not impart a more
stringent preemption standard in the "Barnett paragraph. ' 220 Thus, according
to OCC, Congress's inclusion of "significantly" in the Act was of little
moment. 221 OCC therefore reiterated that all of its previous rulemakings
216. Williams Memorandum to Neyland, supra note 213, at 4 (footnote omitted).
217. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see id. ("The OCC intends this phrase ['interfere with or impair'] as the distillation of the various preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court, as recognized in
...Barnett, and not as a replacement construct that is in any way inconsistent with those
standards.").
218. Williams Memorandum to Neyland, supra note 213, at 2-3.
219. See supra text accompanying note 204.
220. The NPRM asserts that "prevents and significantly interferes" is merely a "touchstone" in the Court's conflict preemption analysis in Barnett: "It is not the only formulation; it
is not set apart from the others; and it is not presented as a test different from the others."
Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,557, 30,562 (May 26, 2011).
221. The NPRM reasons that the Act merely requires preemptive rulemaking to be in
line with the Supreme Court's Barnett decision. Id. And, given that the language "prevents or
significantly interferes" is not part of the Barnett holding, but is merely "exemplary" of the
Barnett standard, OCC claims that it can continue to rely on Barnett itself to justify preemptive rules. Id.
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that had relied on its own formulations of the Barnett standard-that is,
"obstruct, impair, or condition" a national bank's power-remained valid. 222
In its NPRM, OCC modified the Visitorial Powers Rule (again, as OCC officials had previewed) in light of the Dodd-Frank Act's endorsement of Cuomo.
Acknowledging that states are free to enforce their consumer protection laws

by filing suits in court, OCC added language that "an action against a national
bank ... brought by a state attorney general ... to enforce a non-preempted

state law against the national bank ... is not an exercise of visitorial pow3
ers."

22

Finally, OCC acknowledged in the NPRM that Congress overturned the
Supreme Court's Watters decision and proposed to rescind its regulation
preempting state law for subsidiaries of national banks.224
In response to its NPRM, OCC received forty-five public comments, including submissions from state and local officials, a U.S. Senator, and
various financial and consumer protection institutions. 22 5 Far more unusual,
226
the U.S. Treasury Department submitted a trenchant critique.
While OCC's final rule devotes considerable space to addressing the
public comments and critiques, it largely hewed to the position espoused
in the NPRM. 22 7 Significantly, OCC maintained its position on the Barnett

222. 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,563 ("[AIll existing precedents (including judicial decisions and
interpretations) consistent with [the Barnett conflict preemption] analysis are... preserved").
Nonetheless, due to potential "ambiguities and misunderstandings" surrounding the "obstruct,
impair, or condition" standard, OCC proposed to delete that language from OCC rules, leaving
the unadorned citation to Barnett as the relevant preemption standard. Id. at 30,563-64.
223. Id. at 30,564.
224. Id. at 30,562.
225. These comments can be found at www.regulations.gov by searching for the proposed rule with the following docket identification number: OCC-2011-0006.
226. Letter from George Madison, General Counsel, Dep't of the Treasury, to the Hon.
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
June 27, 2011 [hereinafter Treasury Letter]; see V. Gerard Comizio & Helen Y. Lee, Unclear
Whether Latest Preemption Developments Create Clear Path or Muddy Waters for Federally
Chartered Banks, PAUL HASTINGS, July 5, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.
paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1948.pdf (describing Treasury Letter as "unprecedented").
The Treasury Department raised three main objections. First, it expressed concern that
OCC was attempting to broaden the Dodd-Frank Act's preemption standard by reading "prevents or significantly interferes" out of the Act. Second, it disagreed that the Act had no effect
on the preemption standard and likewise disagreed that OCC's preexisting rules based on the
"obstruct, impair, or condition" standard continued to be valid. Third, Treasury wanted OCC
to clarify that it would not pursue categorical preemption. Treasury Letter, supra, at 1-3.
Recall that OCC is, per the Dodd-Frank Act, an independent regulatory agency. Notwithstanding its lack of official power over OCC, the Treasury Department decided to publicly call
out what it perceived to be OCC's errors of judgment.
227. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, Final
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,553-58 (July 21, 2011).
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standard 228
and its position that the Dodd-Frank Act did not alter that
standard.
D. Consumer ProductSafety Commission

CPSC is an independent regulatory agency (thus not bound by E.O.
13132) that took advantage of preamble preemption, notwithstanding its
lack of historical precedent for issuing preemptive rules. CPSC included
language in the preamble to a rule on flammability standards for mattress
sets that preempted any "inconsistent" state law-both in the form of statutory law and tort law. 229 In the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on

regulatory preemption, senators criticized CPSC's inclusion of the preemp23 0

tive preamble in its Mattress Flammability Rule.
The statute that CPSC used to assert preemption, the Flammable Fabrics

Act of 1953 ("FFA"), is one of four product safety statutes that were transferred to the Commission's jurisdiction when it was created in 1972; the
other three statutes are the Federal Hazardous Substances Act of 1960
("FHSA"), the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 ("PPPA"), and the
Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956 ("RSA"). 231 Three of the four transferred
acts contain express preemption clauses.232 Courts have been inconsistent
regarding which statutes preempt state law and which do not: "[C]ourts have
generally found that the FHSA preempts state common law, [but] the opposite is true of the FFA, and the cases are mixed with respect to preemption
of common law under the PPPA"233

The main statute under CPSC's jurisdiction, the Consumer Product
23 4
and a savings clause. 235
Safety Act, contains both a preemption clause
228. Id. at 43,555-56. At the same time, OCC acknowledged that the Act's "prevents or
significantly interferes" language is likely a direct rebuke of OCC's "obstructs, impairs, or
conditions" standard. See id. at 43,566 ("We also recognize that inclusion of the 'prevents or
significantly interferes' conflict preemption formulation in the Barnett standard preemption
provision may have been intended to change OCC's approach by shifting the basis of preemption back to the decision itself, rather than placing reliance on the OCC's efforts to distill the
Barnett principles in this manner [i.e., with the "obstructs, impairs, or conditions" standard].").
229. Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open-Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed.
Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
230. Hearing on Regulatory Preemption, supra note 85, at 3 (statement of Sen. Specter);
id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
231. WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER No. 807,
THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: REGULATORY PREEMPTION AT THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY

5-6 (2008), available at http://progressivereform.org/articles/TruthAbout._
TortsCPSC_807.pdf [hereinafter FUNK ET AL., CPSC] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1203 (FFA); 15
U.S.C. § 1211 (RSA); 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (Effect upon Federal and State Law) (FHSA);
and 15 U.S.C. § 1476 (PPPA)).
232. The RSA does not. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-14 (2006).
233. FUNK ET AL., CPSC, supra note 231, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
COMMISSION

234.

15 U.S.C. §§ 2074-75 (2006).

235.

Id. § 2074(a).
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Several courts, following the Supreme Court's reading of the interplay
between preemption and savings clauses in Geier, have found state tort
law preempted. 236 Against the backdrop of these preemption decisions and
CPSC's preemption preamble, Congress passed the Consumer Product
Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ("CPSIA"),2 37 which explicitly stated that
state tort law should not be construed as preempted by CPSC's rulemaking
and which
disclaimed any preemptive rulemaking authority in the CPSC
itself.238
While Congress's statutory direction has had the most pronounced effect on CPSC's rulemaking and intervention in litigation, the change in
administration and the Presidential Memorandum on Preemption likewise
seem to have had some impact. Compared to its activities under the
George W. Bush Administration, CPSC has been less inclined to offer any
interpretive gloss on preemption in rulemakings beyond simply citing relevant statutory express preemption provisions. Likewise, CPSC has been
more hesitant to enter the litigation fray where preemption is at issue.
1. Congressional Response: Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008
The CPSIA was less a response to CPSC preemption than a response to
the implosion of the agency and the fever pitch of recalls in 2007 that forced
Congress to strengthen product safety protections. 23 9 Congress also attempted to clarify preemption as it applies to CPSC. The Act explicitly states that
the Commission "may not construe any such Act [under its jurisdiction] as
preempting any cause of action under State or local common law or State
statutory law regarding damage claims."240
CPSC general counsel suggested that the CPSIA simply "slaps the
hand" of CPSC with respect to its past preemption by preamble (e.g., the
Mattress Flammability Rule), while leaving general preemption standards
alone (or even buttressing them). 24 1 The CPSIA's legislative history confirms
the general counsel's view that Congress pursued a compromise, "split the
baby" approach. Congressional Democrats championed the bill's protection
236. See, e.g., Bic Pen Corp. v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 251 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex.
2008) (recounting several cases in which preemption was found).
237. Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).
238. Id. § 231(a).
239. See Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through
a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety
and ImprovementAct of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 165, 180-84 (2010).
240. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 23 1(a). Victor Schwartz and
Cary Silverman construe this provision as a "gag order" on the agency that "deprive[s] courts
of guidance that they come to expect from the entity in the best position to understand whether
federal health and safety objectives would be impeded by application of inconsistent state tort
claims." Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 1223.
241. I conducted an interview with CPSC General Counsel. Interview with Cheryl
Falvey, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, in Bethesda, Md. (July 7, 2010).
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of state labeling laws that regulate product safety (in its
sion),242 while Republicans were pleased that the bill
"confusing" patchwork of state laws on lead regulation.243
existing preemption
report noted that the bill 2"reiterat[ed]"
"preserv[ing]" state laws. 44

§ 231(b) provipreempted the
The conference
standards while

Unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, 24 5 the CPSIA does not attempt to clarify the

relationship between state law and federal law for the courts, but is only
specifically directed toward CPSC.246 Professor William Funk nonetheless
suggests that, in slapping the hand of CPSC with respect to preemption, the
CPSIA may cause courts to hesitate before finding preemption.247
2. Response to May 2009 Presidential
Memorandum on Preemption
According to the general counsel, in response to the Preemption Memorandum, the office surveyed. 248 CPSC identified sixteen rules issued over the

past ten years that contained preemptive language. Of the sixteen, the general counsel stated, only two rules "appear to go beyond what the statute
says. ' 249 The first, a rule on bunk bed safety standards issued in 1999, cited
the preemption provisions of the CPSA and the FHSA.2 10 The rule went on
to state that rules promulgated by California and Oklahoma differ from the

federal rule and would thus be preempted in accord with congressional intent under the issuing statutes, and that failure to preempt state law "could
242. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H16,884 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Henry Waxman).
243. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H7581 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (statement of Rep. Joe
Barton) ("[O]ne of the compromises in the bill is that there is Federal preemption, that there is
one standard for all the States, and I am very pleased that that is in the bill."); id. at H7586
(statement of Rep. Ed Whitfield) ("I am glad that this conference report preempts State standards-notably for lead, lead paint and the phthalates I mentioned-and that the authority of
the State Attorneys General is appropriately limited to ensure that enforcement is swift, efficient, and consistent across the country.").
244. H. REP. No. 110-787, at 74 (2008) (Conf. Rep. on H.R. 4040), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong-reports&docid=f:hr
787.1 10.pdf.
245. See infra notes 358-361 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 240 and accompanying text; H. REP. No. 110-501, at 15 (2008)
(Comm. Rep. on H.R. 4040).
247. FUNK ET AL., CPSC, supra note 231, at 8.
248. Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241. According to the general counsel,
although CPSC did the retrospective analysis required by the memorandum, they did not submit a formal report to OMB. Email from Cheryl Falvey, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, to Catherine M. Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Nov. 1, 2010,
13:49 EST) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Email from Cheryl Falvey].
249. Email from Cheryl Falvey, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, to
Catherine M. Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 12, 2010, 21:41 EST)
(on file with Michigan Law Review).
250. See Safety Standard for Bunk Beds, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,888, 71,899 (Dec. 22, 1999)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1213, 1500, & 1513).
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have an adverse economic effect on manufacturers and distributors. '251 Because the CPSIA requires the Commission to update the Bunk Bed Rule, the
Commission plans to defer addressing the preemption asserted in the current
rule until the update is issued.252
The second rule identified by the general counsel is the previously discussed Mattress Flammability Rule. 253 It is the only rule that explicitly
preempts state tort law. 25 4 According to the general counsel, because of the
amount of regulatory activity currently on CPSC's agenda, and given that the
language of CPSIA would prevent a court from giving preemptive effect to
the Mattress Flammability Rule, revoking the preemption language in the
2 55
rule "hasn't been a priority.
Of the remaining fourteen rules, ten identified by the CPSC follow the
same basic boilerplate structure: they first quote the applicable preemption
clause from the statute, and then state that the rule would preempt
nonidentical state and local laws under the statute. For example, rules issued
under the FFA preempt nonidentical "standards or regulations, '256 rules
issued under the PPPA preempt nonidentical "special packaging
standards, '257 and rules issued under the FHSA preempt nonidentical
"requirements. '258 Several of these rules also mention that, although the
CPSC is not bound by E.O. 13132, the Commission evaluated preemption
"in light of the principles" stated in E.O. 13 132.259
Two rules on safety standards for garage door openers simply quote the
relevant preemption provision without offering any interpretation or application to the rule. 26° A 2007 rule on portable generator labeling requirements
disclaims express preemption under the relevant statute, but reserves the
251. Id.
252. Email from Cheryl Falvey, supra note 248.
253. See Final Rule: Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71
Fed. Reg. 13,472 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
254. See id. at 13,496-97.
255. Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241; Email from Cheryl Falvey, supra
note 248.
256. Standard for the Flammability of Mattresses and Mattress Pads, 65 Fed. Reg.
12,935, 12,937-38 (Mar. 10, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1632).
257. Poison Prevention Packaging Requirements; Exemption of Hormone Replacement
Therapy Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,550, 66,552 (Nov. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.FR. pt.
1700).
258. Exemptions from Classification as Banned Hazardous Substances; Exemption for
Certain Model Rocket Propellant Devices for Use with Rocket-Powered Model Cars, 68 Fed.
Reg. 4697, 4698-99 (Jan. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500); Dive Sticks; Final
Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,645, 13,650 (Mar. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
259. E.g., Exemptions from Classification as Banned Hazardous Substances; Exemption
for Certain Model Rocket Propellant Devices for Use with Rocket-Powered Model Cars, 68
Fed. Reg. at 4698-99 (discussing E.O. 13132).
260. Safety Standard for Automatic Residential Garage Door Operators, 72 Fed. Reg.
54,816, 54,817 (Sept. 27, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.FR. pt. 1211); Safety Standard for
Automatic Residential Garage Door Operators, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,656, 70,656 (Nov. 27, 2000)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1211).
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possibility of conflict preemption where it would be impossible for a manu261
facturer to comply with both the federal rule and a state requirement.
Finally, a 2008 rule on certificates of compliance cites the relevant preemption provision but punts on its interpretation, stating that "the preemptive
effect of this rule would be determined in an appropriate proceeding in a
262
court of competent jurisdiction.
According to the general counsel, the agency, going forward, would reference the relevant statute(s) in its rulemakings, but would not offer any
interpretive gloss, especially where state common law was at issue.263
3. Rulemaking
In response to the Presidential Memorandum on Preemption, CPSC has
deliberately included a more passive statement regarding preemption in recent rulemakings. 264 Five 2010 preemptive rulemakings---each of which
addresses nursery products-use the same boilerplate language:
Section 26(a) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2075(a), provides that where a "consumer product safety standard under [the CPSA]" is in effect and applies
to a product, no State or political subdivision of a State may either establish or continue in effect a requirement dealing with the same risk
of injury
265
unless the State requirement is identical to the Federal standard.

The boilerplate language is limited to the express preemption provisions of
the CPSA and cites the CPSIA for further preemptive support.
Other rules issued before 2010 but after the CPSIA only briefly touch on
preemption, if at all. CPSC's rule on lead content limits for children's toys
states: "According to Executive Order 12988 (February 5, 1996), agencies
must state in clear language the preemptive effect, if any, of new regulations.
The preemptive effect of regulations such as this proposal is stated in section 18 of the FHSA. 15 U.S.C. 1261n."2 66 The rule on labeling for
267
children's toy advertisements does not address preemption.
CPSC has not ventured an interpretive gloss on preemption even in areas
that are of particular concern to it, such as whether states could enact different
261. Portable Generators; Final Rule; Labeling Requirements, 72 Fed. Reg. 1443, 1445
(Jan. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1407).
262. Certificates of Compliance, 73 Fed. Reg. 68,328, 68,331 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be
codified at 16 C.ER. pt. 1110).
263. Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241.
264. Id.
265. Safety Standards for Full-Size Baby Cribs and Non-Full-Size Baby Cribs; Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,308, 43,321 (proposed July 23, 2010) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1219, 1220, & 1500) (alterations in original).
266. Children's Products Containing Lead; Determinations Regarding Lead Content
Limits on Certain Materials or Products; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 43,031, 43,041 (Aug. 26,
2009) (to be codified at 16 C.ER. pt. 1500).
267. Labeling Requirement for Toy and Game Advertisements; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,730 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.FR. pt. 1500).
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testing regime requirements. 268 A 2010 rule on testing punts on this preemption question:
Executive Order 12988 (February 5, 1996), requires agencies to state in
clear language the preemptive effect, if any, of new regulations. The proposed regulation would be issued under authority of the CPSA and the
CPSIA. The CPSA provision on preemption appears at section 26 of the
CPSA. The CPSIA provision on preemption appears at section 231 of the
CPSIA. The preemptive effect of this rule would be determined in an appropriate proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction. 69
4. Litigation
According to the general counsel, under the Obama Administration the
agency has been extremely reluctant to "step into the fray" of litigation
surrounding preemption issues, whereas under the George W. Bush
Administration the agency likely would have taken a position. 270 The
general counsel mentioned the example of an Illinois statute, the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act of 2010,271 that prescribes a labeling requirement
for lead in toys. If CPSC issues warning labels for lead, state labeling
requirements are preempted. 272 Proponents of the Illinois statute argue that,
because there is no current federal lead labeling standard for children's toys,
the FHSA preemption provision is not triggered.2 73 Commentators have
noted that this statute will likely be challenged. 274 According to the general
counsel, while the toy industry has urged CPSC to challenge the statute, the
agency's current position is not to engage, but instead to wait for the toy
275
industry to sue on its own.
E. Environmental ProtectionAgency
In contrast to the aggressive preemptive efforts in the past by NHTSA,
FDA, and OCC, the policies of EPA stand as a possible springboard to develop a model for "best practices" involving state and local government

268.

Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241.

269. Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification, 75 Fed. Reg. 28,336,
28,361 (proposed May 20, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.ER. pt. 1107).
270.
271.
272.

Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241.
410 ILL. CoMIP. STAT. ANN. 45 (West 2010).
15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (Effect upon Federal and State Law) (2006).

273. See Illinois Lead Warning Label Required in 2010, UL-STR (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.strquality.com/en-us/newsevents/Pages/illinois-lead-waming-label-required-in2010.aspx; John W. Moss, New State Labeling Laws: Preempted?, LAW 360, Apr. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/NewStateProductLabeling
LawsPreempted.pdf.
274. See, e.g., Greenberg Traurig, Presentation to American Apparel & Footwear
Ass'n, State Law Updates, 9 (Oct, 29, 2009), available at https://www.apparelandfootwear.
org/UserFiles/File/Presentations/102909cpsia/citera.pdf.
275. Interview with Cheryl Falvey, supra note 241.
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officials in the federal regulatory process. 276 Whereas other federal agencies
sidestepped the consultation and reporting requirements of E.O. 13132, EPA
published its official policies on how to comply with E.O. 13132.277 For this

reason, I analyze recent EPA rulemaking in the context of the recommendations in Part III.
Here, I consider the extent to which the relationship between EPA and

the states is unique, and therefore potentially less generalizable to other federal agencies. Because environmental protection laws mandate enforcement
of federal law by state regulatory agencies, EPA has gained knowledge, ex-

perience, and practice cooperating with state authorities and being sensitive
to state interests.

278

1. Response to May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption
EPA's memo to OMB lists nine rules that EPA's Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation and EPA's Office of General Counsel determined
preempt state law.2 79 All nine of these rules preempted state law through

express statutory preemption, not through implied conflict preemption or
preamble preemption. The four Clean Air Act ("CAA") rules listed, for example, preempted state regulation of air pollution (except for California)
under the CAA's express preemption provisions by setting federal standards
for nonroad emission controls2 80 and sulfur fuel controls. 2 81 Out of the four
CAA rules, only the most recent rule from 2008 found that promulgating a
276. I conducted in-person interviews with several EPA officials. Interview with Ken
Munis, Assoc. Dir., Office of Regulatory Policy & Mgmt.; Eileen McGovern, Office of Regulatory Policy & Mgmt.; David Coursen, Attorney Advisor, Cross-Cutting Issues Law Office,
Office of Gen. Counsel; and Sonja Rodman, Attorney, Cross-Cutting Issues Law Office, Office
of Gen. Counsel in Washington, D.C. (July 14, 2010) (group interview) [hereinafter Interview
with EPA Officials]; Interview with Carol Ann Siciliano, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Cross-Cutting
Issues Law Office, Office of General Counsel, in Washington, D.C. (July 15, 2010).
277. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: GUIDANCE
ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM (2008) [hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE].
278. See Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2159-60; see also Abbe
R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
FederalLaw in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (recognizing that states

can have significant roles in implementing federal statutes, especially environmental statutes
like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act).
279. Email from Nicole Owens, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Dominic J. Mancini, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget (Aug. 4, 2009, 08:24 EST) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also
Memorandum from Ken Munis, Assoc. Dir., Office of Regulatory Policy & Mgmt., on EPA
Process for Identifying "Preemption" per President's Memo (on file with the Michigan Law
Review).

280. Control of Emissions from Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines and Equipment, 73
Fed. Reg. 59,034, 59,038-39 (Oct. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 60, 80, 85, 86,
89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 1027, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1060, 1065, 1068 &
1074).
281. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 508485 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pts. 69, 80 & 86) (promulgating under Clean
Air Act § 211(c)(4)).
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rule that triggered statutory preemption invoked the "federalism implications" provision of E.O. 13132.282 The other three rules, whose preambles
explained their effect on state law, nevertheless disclaimed significant federalism implications. Instead, they simply relied on continuing statutory
preemption that triggered EO. 13132 under express preemption. 2 3 For all
four CAA rules, EPA noted that 4it met and consulted with state and local
2
officials in developing each rule.
EPA listed two rules that preempted state regulation of hazardous materials under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA").28 5 Similar to the
CAA rules, these rules did not assert preemption on their own accord, but
simply referred to the statutory preemption provision in the TSCA. 28 6 EPA
did not meet with state and local officials, however, stating that the noticeand-comment process gave state and local officials sufficient opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking in compliance with E.O. 13132.287
EPA listed two rules regulating the transportation of hazardous materials
that it promulgated with DOT.288 The first rule, which reduced the paper-

282. Control of Emissions from Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines and Equipment, 73
Fed. Reg. at 59,172 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999)).
283. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5134 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255) ("This final rule does not have federalism
implications:'); Phase 2 Emission Standards for New Nonroad Spark-Ignition Handheld Engines at or Below 19 Kilowatts and Minor Amendments to Emission Requirements Applicable to
Small Spark-Ignition Engines and Marine Spark-Ignition Engines, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,268, 24,304
(Apr. 25, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 90 & 91) (same); Control of Air Pollution from
New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control
Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698, 6821 (Feb. 10, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pts. 80, 85
& 86) (same).
284. Control of Emissions from Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines and Equipment, 73
Fed. Reg. at 59,172 (describing consultation with the National Association of Clean Air Agencies and with states that asked EPA to tighten federal standards if under new statutory
preemption they would be unable to piggyback on California standards); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway
Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5134 (noting consultation with
California and Alaska to develop diesel sulfur rules exempted from federal standard); Phase 2
Emission Standards for New Nonroad Spark-Ignition Handheld Engines at or Below 19 Kilowatts and Minor Amendments to Emission Requirements Applicable to Small Spark-Ignition
Engines and Marine Spark-Ignition Engines, 65 Fed. Reg. at 24,304 (describing consultation
with California to develop "harmonized requirements," because California was already regulating in this area under its CAA preemption exemption); Control of Air Pollution from New
Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 6821 (noting that it "consult[ed]" with states in developing rule).
285. Reclassification of PCB and PCB-Contaminated Electrical Equipment, 66 Fed. Reg.
17,602, 17,616 (Apr. 2, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pt. 761); Asbestos Worker Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,210, 69,215 (Nov. 15, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763).
286. Reclassification of PCB and PCB-Contaminated Electrical Equipment, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 17,616; Asbestos Worker Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 69,215.
287. Id.
288. Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Manifest System, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,776 (Mar. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 261,
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work required for transporting hazardous material, preempted any state laws
that required different documentation for hazmat manifests under the Hazardous Material Transportation Act ("HMTA").2

89

Though the rule described

the changes to manifest requirements as "minor," EPA and DOT still held
two public meetings for state and local officials, which twenty-three states
and territories attended. 290 State and local officials were also invited to par-

ticipate in the EPA workgroup charged with developing the rule.2 9' The
other HMTA rule, promulgated before E.O. 13132 took effect, preempted
292
state law by clarifying the interaction between the HMTA and the CAA.
EPA, interpreting the CAA, said that states could not use the more lenient

preemption standards in the CAA to promulgate rules for hazardous materi293

als that would otherwise be preempted by the HMTA.
Finally, EPA also listed a rule preempting state law under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 2 94 Another pre-E.O. 13132 rule, this rule again used

statutory preemption, because the CWA preempts state law regulating discharges from vessels once EPA sets standards. 295 In developing this
discharge standard for armed forces vessels, EPA noted that it consulted
with both the Environmental Council of the States ("ECOS")296 and the
armed forces, and also that "representatives from the Navy (as the lead for

the [Department of Defense]), EPA, and the Coast Guard met with each
297
State expressing an interest in the [rule's] development."

2. Uniqueness of the Environmental Protection Agency:
Agency and States as Coregulators
EPA and the states have developed a collaborative relationship as

coregulators, particularly over the past twenty years. EPA has an internal
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations ("OCIR") that
coordinates a variety of state-EPA performance partnerships, such as the
262, 263, 264, 265 & 271); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Amendments to the Worst-Case Release
Scenario Analysis for Flammable Substances, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,696 (May 26, 1999) (to be
codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 68).
289. Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Manifest System, 70 Fed. Reg. at 10,813.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Amendments to the Worst-Case Release Scenario Analysis
for Flammable Substances, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,698.
293. Id.
294. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64
Fed. Reg. 25,126 (May 10, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 69 & Ch. VII).
295. Id. at25,131.
296. For more information on the involvement of ECOS, see infra notes 338 & 392 and
accompanying text.
297. Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 25,129.
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National Environmental Performance Partnership System ("NEPPS").2 98
The most current iteration of the NEPPS plan (FY 2011) lists several
objectives for the partnership between EPA and the states. 299 These
objectives, which target strengthening communication and information flow,
include "[c]onduct[ing] joint strategic planning that reflects Performance
Partnership principles in [the Performance Partnership Agreements]" and
"[a]dvanc[ing] Performance Partnership principles through effective
collaboration with states on policy and implementation issues.' '3°

This close look at the responses to the Presidential Memorandum on
Preemption within NHTSA, FDA, OCC, CPSC, and EPA, and these agencies' partially successful efforts to ensure compliance with E.O. 13132,
reveal various avenues for reform.
III. AGENCY REFORM
Despite near consensus that the procedural requirements of the Federalism Executive Order are sound, compliance with those requirements has
been spotty at best. A 1999 GAO Report, analyzing compliance with the
Reagan-era Federalism Executive Order (E.O. 12612),"' identified only five
rules out of 11,000 issued between April 1996 and December 1998 that included a federalism impact statement.30 2 Compliance scarcely improved

298.

OFFICE OF CONG. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGEN-

CY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM: FY 2011 NATIONAL

GUIDANCE 7 (2011) ("EPA and states and tribes set priorities, design strategies, and negotiate
grant agreements together .... ").
Many of the more formal EPA/state coordination efforts began in earnest during the early
years of the Clinton Administration. See DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 2-7 (2d ed. rev. and updated
2004) (describing initial outreach efforts by EPA and organization efforts by states to negotiate implementation with EPA). For example, the discussions at the State/EPA Capacity
Steering Committee, which formed in 1993, led to the 1995 NEPPS Plan, "which uses negotiated state performance agreements 'to increase state participation and flexibility, while
improving EPA's working relationship with the states and reducing the costs of implementing
federal environmental statutes.'" Christopher Terranova, Challenging Agency Preemption 8
n.40 (Working Paper, May 12, 2009) (quoting FLA. CTR. FOR PUB. MGMT., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM (NEPPS) 1), available at http://
papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1403628.
299. OFFICE OF CONG. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 298, at 3-4.
300. Id. at 3-6.
301. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987).
302. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. GAO found that 26 percent of
all rules issued over this period of time cited E.O. 12612. Id. at 4. Not counting the five rules
that included an FIS, those 26 percent that cited E.O. 12612 included only "'boilerplate' certifications with little or no discussion of why the rule did not trigger the executive order's
requirements." Id.
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Obama
under the Clinton-era E.O. 13132 (continued under the Bush and
3 °3
Administrations), as Professor Mendelson and I have documented.

Why is this? Professors Donahue and Pollack offer one astute explana34
tion: "Federalism criteria ...do not have a natural home in agencies. 0
Another key problem that my research and investigation reveals is that, in
the context of federal preemption of state tort law (as opposed to state regulations), it is unclear who best represents the state interest at hand, which, in
turn, impedes meaningful participation by the states in the agency decisionmaking process.3 °5
303. See Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 14, at 784 n. 192 (estimating that for proposed
rules during one quarter in 1998, FISs were included in only 9 of 2,456 agency rulemakings);
id. at 783 (finding six FISs in one quarter of 2003, a time period in which roughly 600 final
and proposed rules were issued); id. at 783-84 (demonstrating that FISs are relatively rare and
of "poor quality"); Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 14, at 719 (reporting results from a
study of 2006 preemptive rules, which disclosed only a single substantive FIS out of six
preemptive rules); Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2139 ("The story is
one of outright contradictions-agencies initially claimed that the proposed rule would not
have a substantial effect on the federal-state balance, only to assert the preemptive effect upon
promulgation of the final rule-coupled with cavalier denials of any impact on federalism,
even where the preemptive intent of the agency's rule was apparent."); id. at 2139-43 (providing numerous examples of FDA and NHTSA rulemakings whereby the agency disclaimed any
federalism implications in a proposed or interim rule, followed by an assertion of preemption
in the final rule, or else the agency denied the federalism impact of a clearly preemptive rule).
304. John D. Donahue & Mark A. Pollack, Centralization and Its Discontents: The
Rhythms of Federalismin the United States and the European Union, in THE FEDERAL VISION:
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UN-

73, 131 (Kalypso Nicolafdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); see also id. ("Further, unlike
benefit-cost analysis, they do not have a natural home in OMB. This, combined with a lack of
attention by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, made [the Federalism Executive
Order] a non-priority.").
305. Because I appreciated this issue at the outset, see Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2158-63, I made considerable efforts to identify and interview an array
of interested stakeholders that included, but was not limited to, the "Big Seven" national organizations that OMB singled out as the appropriate consultants on E.O. 13132. I solicited
additional input from representatives of state judges, state attorneys general, and various consumer- and business-oriented groups.
I conducted a roundtable discussion with the so-called "Big Seven" national organizations of state and local governmental officials in Washington, D.C. on July 6, 2010.
Participants included Carolyn Coleman, National League of Cities ("NLC"); Edward Ferguson, National Association of Counties; Susan Parnas Frederick, National Conference of State
Legislatures; Elizabeth Kellar, International City/County Management Association; David
Parkhurst, National Governors Association ("NGA"); David Quam, NGA; Stephanie Spirer,
NLC; and Chris Whatley, Council of State Governments. A representative from the U.S. Conference of Mayors was invited, but did not attend. Interview with the "Big Seven," in
Washington, D.C. (July 6, 2010).
I interviewed Judge Gregory Mize, Judicial Fellow, National Center for State Courts, on
July 7, 2010. Interview with Judge Gregory Mize, Judicial Fellow, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts,
in Bethesda, Md. (July 7, 2010). Judge Mize monitors policy proposals in the federal government that likely raise federalism issues for state courts. He was my liaison with the
Conference of Chief Justices ("CCJ"), an association of the presiding officers of every state
supreme court, which "has traditionally adopted formal positions to defend against proposed
policies that threaten principles of federalism or that seek to preempt state court authority."
Letter from Jean Hoefer Toal, President, Conference of Chief Justices, to Div. of Dockets
ION
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This Part describes the reforms I have devised in an effort to enhance
agency compliance with the Federalism Executive Order, reforms that directly confront the absence of a "natural home" issue and the state-interest
representative issue. More specifically, I recommend the following:
1. The development of internal agency guidelines specifying how an
agency is to determine if a rulemaking implicates federalism concerns.
Such guidelines will create a structure-that is, a "home"-within
agencies for compliance with the Federalism Executive Order. Part and
parcel of such internal reform within agencies is the development of internal
standards for evaluating evidence asserted in support of a preemptive
rulemaking. Under this proposed system, agencies would be required to
support their preemption conclusions with empirical data, which would then
be scrutinized within the agencies themselves before the conclusions could
be incorporated into proposed rules.
2. Enhancement of the process by which agencies consult with the
states. My recommendations here take several forms: First, there should be
an expanded view of who are the appropriate representatives of state interests. Improved outreach to the "Big Seven"3 °6 is a key first step, but a first
step only. Second, agency-specific liaison groups should be developed and
fostered. Third, a mandatory notification procedure should be introduced
whereby state attorneys general and NAAG are automatically notified of
proposed rulemakings by agencies, and who, in turn, can then notify the
relevant representatives of the potentially affected state interests. This novel
recommendation is designed to enhance participation by state interests in
the rulemaking process by delegating to state attorneys general the task of
identifying the relevant representatives-a task that they, relative to federal
agencies, are better poised to carry out. Fourth, procedures should be developed whereby agencies are encouraged to consult with state representatives
early in the rulemaking process.
This Part also describes reforms that should be implemented within
OMB and OIRA. These agency-oversight departments of the federal govMgmt., FDA 1 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=FDA-2008-N-0032-0019. CCJ has occasionally responded to outreach from federal
agencies. See, e.g., id.

For input on the role of state attorneys general, I interviewed James McPherson, Executive Director of National Association of Attorneys General, by telephone on November 2,
2010 and November 10, 2010, and Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, National Association of Attorneys General, in person on July 19, 2010. Telephone Interview with James
McPherson, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter November 2
Interview with James McPherson]; Telephone Interview with James McPherson, Exec. Dir.,
Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. (Nov. 10, 2010) [hereinafter November 10 Interview with James
McPherson]; Interview with Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., in Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2010). I also interviewed James Tierney, Director of
the National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law School, by telephone on
October 20, 2010. Telephone Interview with James Tierney, Dir., Nat'l State Attorneys Gen.
Program at Columbia Law Sch. (Oct. 20, 2010).
306. The "Big Seven" include NGA, National Conference of State Legislatures, Council
of State Governments, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, International
City/County Management Association, and National Association of Counties.
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ernment can play a key role in enhancing agency compliance with the Federalism Executive Order by doing the following:
1. Directing agencies to publish reports of their compliance with the 2009
Presidential Memorandum on Preemption;
2.

Updating the OMB Guidance Document to include the most current information about state consultation groups; and

3. Improving the ways that OIRA oversees agency compliance with E.O.
13132.
A. Agencies

1. Internal Guidelines for Implementing the Preemption Provisions
of Federalism Executive Order 13132 and Evaluating
Evidence in Support of Preemption
a. Internal Guidelines

Internal agency guidelines for implementing the preemption provisions
will provide structure to the agency's compliance with the Federalism Executive Order. Agencies should be able to cite their own internal guidelines in
federalism impact statements to explain whether or not a specific rulemaking implicates federalism concerns and, if so, to justify the specific actions
taken in response. Such internal guidelines would foster consistency in the
agency's federalism review. In addition to the practical function, the existence and dissemination of such internal guidelines would also help foster an
internal agency culture that is committed to ensuring compliance with the
Federalism Executive Order.
EPA's November 2008 "Guidance on Executive Order 13132: Federalism"
provides a model of an easy-to-follow, comprehensive set of internal guidelines. EPA's guidance document goes beyond what E.O. 13132 requires,
"reflecting EPA's commitment to early and meaningful intergovernmental
consultation," 30 7 but is consistent with my further reconmendations on state
consultation below.
EPA's comprehensive, fifty-six page guidance document gives direction
for implementing E.O. 13132 for rules, proposed legislation, informal policy
statements, adjudications, and waivers. 30 8 The guidance document provides
flowcharts for determining if a rule has federalism implications under E.O.
13132. 309 The guidelines provide answers to regulatory questions such as
"What do I do if my rule does not have [federalism implications] ... but [it]
307. EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 277, at 2; see also id. at 11 ("Even if your rule does not
have [federalism implications], if it has any adverse impact on [state or local] governments
above a minimal level, then you are subject to EPA's consultation requirements.... This internal policy is broader than EO 13132.").
308.

See id. passim.

309.

See id. attachment B at 36-42.
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has more than minimal adverse impacts on [state or local] governments[?]"310 With respect to the federalism implications of a preemptive
rule, the EPA is notably clear: "EPA rules would have
[federalism implica311
tions] because they ... preempt [state or local] law."
EPA's guidance document proceeds step-by-step through the rulemaking
process, from "tiering" the rule, to convening a federalism workgroup within EPA, to preparing a consultation plan, to consulting, to drafting the
preamble, to agency and OMB review, to preparing an "Action memo," and
finally to publishing a proposed rule.3 12 EPA has formalized many aspects of
the regulatory review process, and lists what is expected of agency officials
who shepherd a rule through the regulatory process. The guidance document
states at many points that an official attempting to determine whether a rule
has federalism implications is required to "[c]onsult with [the official's Office of General Counsel] workgroup representative and [the official's]
Regulatory Steering Committee Representative. '313 These standing representatives should be consulted to determine if the rule preempts state law
and has federalism implications, 34 to prepare a consultation plan, and to
3 15
review draft FISs.
The guidance document also gives direction and advice on interacting
with state and local officials. It includes a list of contact information for the
"Big Ten" organizations that EPA mandates be contacted.3 16 While inclusion
of such contact information may seem basic, it is apparently missing at other agencies. Members of the "Big Seven" told anecdotes about misdirected
correspondence from agencies.317
The EPA document addresses questions like, "How much consultation is
enough?" 318 Moreover, it provides further advice by highlighting the common concerns of elected officials as expressed to EPA: money required for
program implementation; requiring the state or local government to comply
as a regulated party; interference with division of responsibilities between
levels of government; command and control rules; and impact on local in310.
311.

Id.at 11.
Id. at 5.

312.
313.

See id. at 13-18.
See, e.g., id. at 7.

314.
315.

See id. at 7, 14, 18.
See id. at 19-20.

316.

Id. at 4, attachment C at 45-46, attachment D (listing "Big 10" and "More Forums

for Contacting Elected Officials"). The "Big Ten" include the more traditional "Big Seven"
state and local organizations, as well as the National Association of Towns and Townships,
County Executives of America, and ECOS. See id. at 4 n.3.
317. At the roundtable discussion with the "Big Seven," representatives told of mail
addressed to former officials of their organization, instances where the agency claimed contact

was made but could not verify to whom correspondence was sent, and the like. Interview with
the "Big Seven," supra note 305.
318.

EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 277, at 21 ("For rules with [federalism implications]

...at a minimum you should consult ...with each of the relevant representative national
organizations in the Big 10.").
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dustry, employment, or land use.3 9 To develop a consultation plan for state
and local officials, the document provides
an appendix with three pages of
20
factors to consider in building the plan.1
EPA's guidance document also tries to address the problem of enforcing
agency procedures that concern federalism issues. The guidance document
states that, to ensure compliance with E.O. 13132, EPA's Office of Policy,
Economics, and Innovation should collect and analyze key information, including all existing and contemplated rules with any federalism impact, the
status of federalism consultation plans, and any problems in carrying out the
consultation plan that would affect the federalism official's ability to certify
that EPA is in compliance with E.O. 13132.321
With EPA's guidance document as a benchmark, each of the other agencies surveyed came up short. Some agencies, such as FDA-which
apparently does not have any published guidelines 322 -must begin at square
one, whereas others, such as NHTSA and OCC, should focus on updating
and expanding their existing guidelines.
DOT (within which NHTSA lies) uses a 1988 document-"DOT Guidance: Federalism" 323-which provides some constructive direction on
improving the rulemaking process. It states that agencies should include
federalism notices in notices of proposed rulemaking. 324 And it suggests that
agencies should err on the side of including a federalism assessment, even if
'325
the impact is "borderline.
That said, the DOT guidance document leaves much to be desired. As an
initial matter, it is out-of-date. The 1988 guidance document is based on
President Reagan's 1987 Executive Order,3 26 which was superseded in 1999
by E.O. 13132. Several provisions from E.O. 13132 are missing from the
DOT document, 327 which (unlike EPA's guidance document) is thus not a
stand-alone, self-contained manual that includes all of the relevant
information necessary for agency officials to conduct a federalism analysis
and to ensure compliance with E.O. 13132. Moreover, its directionespecially as compared to EPA's guidance document-is vague and

319. Id. at 23-24.
320. Id. attachment E.
321. Id. at 24. EPA publishes a listing of all rules under development with any federalism impact in its semiannual Regulatory Agenda. See id.
322.

Interview with Ralph Tyler, supra note 134.

323.

OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT GUIDANCE: FEDERALISM

(1988) [hereinafter DOT GUIDANCE].
324. See id. VIII.A.1 (stating consultation should take place through notice-andcomment proceedings).
325. See id. IIII.B.3.
326. Id. I.
327. Compare id., with Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 6(b)-(c), 3 C.F.R. 206, 209-10
(1999). For example, section 6 of E.O. 13132 mandates that agencies engage in "meaningful
and timely" consultation with the states "early in the process of developing the proposed regulation." Id. § 6(a)-(b), 3 C.FR. at 209.
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unspecific at times. For example, in describing the depth of a federalism
assessment, the document states:
The Assessment should be of whatever length and analytic justification
are necessary to describe the likely effects, possible alternatives, and the
rationale for the position chosen. Although the approach and depth of the
document will vary according to the circumstances, it is not anticipated
that in most cases it will substantially increase the amount of analysis already being performed.328

From this guideline, it is not clear what type of federalism review is "necessary," nor whether an official is even supposed to do anything at all if the
assessment is not supposed to "substantially increase" the analysis being
performed. Additionally, the definition of "sufficient" federalism implications is too vague to provide definitive guidance.32 9

OCC operates with a description of E.O. 13132 contained within its
2005 "Guide to OCC Rulemaking Procedures: A Staff Manual. ' 330 In a 2005
report investigating OCC preemption, GAO criticized OCC's lack of a detailed regulatory process and singled out the fact that OCC did not have
written guidance, policies, or procedures for the rulemaking process, but
instead relied on a barebones "rulemaking checklist. 331 The OCC guide,
dated December 2005, two months after the 2005 GAO Report, does not
advance much further than the "checklist" approach-at least as it concerns
E.O. 13132. The guide to E.O. 13132 is about a single page; it names OCC's
federalism official, states that the project attorney makes an initial federalism assessment that is checked by the federalism official, states generally
what to include in an FIS, and denotes the Conference of State Bank Supervisors ("CSBS") as the main state contact for federalism issues (primarily
through meetings
through the notice-and-comment process, but occasionally
332
when OCC determines that it is "appropriate").
OCC officials explained that all rulemaking is centralized within the Division of Legislative and Regulatory Activities. There is no separate track
for preemptive rulemakings; the federalism compliance review is done as
part of the general rulemaking process. OCC officials conceded that, as a
formal matter, in terms of internal guidelines for compliance with E.O.
13132, the procedures are "a bit out of date." They explained that there is a
328. DOT GUIDANCE, supra note 323, [V.D.
329. See id. IV.A. ("The same kind of analysis that is used to determine whether an
action is 'major' under E.O. 12291, 'significant' under the Department's Regulatory Policies
and Procedures, or has a 'significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities' under the Regulatory Flexibility Act should generally be used to determine the
sufficiency of the federalism implications.").
330. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, GUIDE TO OCC RULEMAKING
PROCEDURES: A STAFF MANUAL 17-18 (2005) [hereinafter OCC GUIDE].
331. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). For its
report, GAO reviewed the relevant documents for proposed and final preemption rules, interviewed OCC officials who participated in promulgation of the rules, and analyzed documents
from its docket files. Id. at 4.
332. OCC GUIDE, supra note 330, at 17-18.
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checklist and narrative description of aspects of rulemaking that should be
considered and that the requirements of E.O. 13132 are described. OCC
officials emphasized that, because the law department is a relatively small
office, the supervisor for any particular rulemaking ensures that a federalism
analysis is conducted-albeit informally-where necessary. 333

Of the agencies surveyed that are subject to E.O. 13132, only EPA provides a publicly available, comprehensive document providing step-by-step
direction to its officials in conducting federalism review pursuant to E.O.
13132. The other agencies should devise and implement (and make publicly
available) similar internal guidelines. The focus should be on development
of a simple, easy-to-follow, comprehensive document that can be cited in the
agency's FIS. Publicly available internal guidelines would go a long way
toward reassuring the state-interest stakeholders as well as the public at
large that agencies are taking compliance with E.O. 13132 seriously. Internal guidelines, moreover, can have a significant practical effect. EPA has
cited its guidance document in recent rulemakings. In its Coal Rule, for example, EPA referenced its guidance document when it noted that even
though the rule did not preempt state law, EPA included an FIS because the
rule would impose "substantial compliance cost[s]" (defined as greater than
$25 million) on the states.33 4 EPA cited its guidance document to explain
other actions it took under the rule, such as sending letters to the "Big Ten"
organizations that EPA and OMB identified as representing state and local
3 35

interests.

The existence of publicly available guidelines can also serve as an accountability check on an agency. For example, in promulgating its 2009
Stormwater Rule, EPA acknowledged that the rule had federalism implications, 336 but nonetheless neglected to consult with state and local officials or
ECOS as instructed under its internal guidelines.337 These groups were then
own guidelinesable to direct EPA's attention to this lapse in following 3its
38
which prompted an apology and explanation from EPA.
The creation of comprehensive internal guidelines provides consistency
in an agency's federalism review, which in turn ensures that adequate
measures are taken to meet the requirements of E.O. 13132. It is the first
333. OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185. The above paragraph is based on the
interview.
334. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of
Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128, 35,226 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265,
268, 271, & 302) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Id.
336. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Development Point Source Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,996, 63,055 (Dec. 1, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.FR. pt. 450) (intemal quotation marks omitted).
337. See id. at 63,055-56.
338. Email from R. Steven Brown, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Council of the States, to Catherine
M. Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 12, 2010, 15:15 EST) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
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necessary step in creating a "home" for federalism review of preemptive
rulemakings within federal agencies.
b. InternalOversight

Federal agencies should develop an internal standard for evaluating the
evidence asserted in support of a preemptive rulemaking. This standard
should be akin to the "agency reference model" standard that I have proposed for court review of agency positions on preemption, which is
premised on judicial scrutiny of the contemporaneous agency record to determine precisely the risks weighed by the agency.33 9
The core idea is to force the agency to provide documented empirical

evidence that supports its preemption conclusion and then to submit the factual predicate to some systematic scrutiny within the agency. The agency
should be required to identify and analyze the data that support the asserted

conflict between state law and the federal regulatory scheme. 340 This empir339. In a series of articles, I have set forth the agency reference model for preemption
decisionmaking. There is an internal agency piece:
Behind agency decisions to regulate or to refrain from regulating is a rich body of empirical cost-benefit (or increasingly risk-risk) analyses. These analyses made by the agency
at the time of its action (or inaction), as well as the nature of the agency action and the
contemporaneous reasons given by the agency to justify it, can guide courts' judgments
regarding the need for, and equally significantly, the present feasibility of, uniform national regulatory standards.
Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption, supra note 4, at 453; id. at 477-521. Moreover, there
is an equally important judicial review component:
Courts have an opportunity to scrutinize both the empirical substrate of the regulatory
record compiled by the agency as well as its articulated reasons underlying any interpretive policy. Anticipation of such judicial review at this stage would force agencies ... not
only to adhere to the strictures of the [Federalism Executive Order], but also to compile a
diligent agency record that would serve as the basis of the court's evaluation of whether
the state tort action seeks to "redo" the analysis conducted by the agency and should
therefore be ousted.
Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2130; see also id. at 2188-89.
340. The American Bar Association ("ABA") has adopted a resolution recommending
that federal agencies subject to E.O. 13132 should have to provide:
(a) [F]actual support in the record for any assertions that state tort law has in the past interfered or is currently interfering with the operation of federal laws or regulations, or (b)
reasoning to support any predictions or concerns that state tort law would in the future
interfere with the operation of federal laws or regulations.
Am. Bar Ass'n, Res. 117, § 3 (2010) [hereinafter ABA Res. 117], available at
http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/filesflutter/1282164714Resolutionl l7Summary
080910.doc (passing resolution). Part (a) is akin to the factual predicate recommended here
(and in my "agency reference model"). Although the ABA specifically limited its focus to
agency preemption of state tort law, my recommendation applies more generally to preemption of state law (including state statutes and regulations). My recommendation goes even
further by calling for this factual predicate evidence to be included in a document signed by
the head of the program office and to be made part of the public rulemaking docket for comments.
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ical evidence should be included in a document signed by the head of the
program office and inserted into the public docket for the rulemaking.3 4 1 The
rulemaking notice should draw attention to the document and specifically
342
invite comment on it.
Exhibit A for the need for such an internal agency standard and review
process is FDA's 2006 Drug Labeling Rule. The FDA asserted its preemptive intent in the preamble to the final rule: "FDA believes that under
existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act ...
preempts conflicting or contrary State law." 43 The main thrust of FDA's
federalism impact statement was that FDA had legal authority to preempt
state law in this area. 344 Such purely legalistic determinations would not suffice to satisfy the proposed factual predicate standard. Moreover, as the U.S.
Supreme Court remarked in Levine:
[T]he Office of Chief Counsel ignored the warnings from FDA scientists
and career officials that the preemption language [of the 2006 preamble]
was based on erroneous assertions about the ability of the drug approval
process to ensure accurate and up-to-date drug labels. 45
This scenario suggests the need for a counterbalance to. the Office of the
Chief Counsel, which the proposed empirical evidentiary requirement could
provide.
Exhibit B for the need for such internal oversight is NHTSA's 2005
Roof Crush Rule. As its 2009 rewrite of the rule makes clear, the factual
predicates for NHTSA's preemption conclusion simply did not hold up. In
341. Attention must be paid to the practical realities of how different offices in an agency
function in relation to each other. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (examining "how administrative law allocates power within agencies and how arguments from expertise, legalism, and politics apply
inside agencies rather than across institutions").
342. The agency should have to go through the same internal procedure with respect to
any rule with potential preemptive effect. In other words, the agency would have to document
the empirical evidence-via a report signed by the head of the program office and inserted
into the public rulemaking docket-not only when the agency asserts preemptive effect, but
also when it disclaims preemption. Concededly, a one-way ratchet effect (which is a wider
judicial review phenomenon) may nonetheless exist here: the agency will have an easier time
evading judicial review due to its "inaction"-disclaiming preemption-as compared to its
"action"-invoking preemption. But, at least where an agency revokes a prior preemptive
rulemaking, the requirements should stick. For an example of an agency disclaiming a rulemaking's preemptive effect, see "Exhibit B" on NHTSA's Roof Crush Rule, infra text
accompanying notes 346-350.
343. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
201, 314, & 601).
344. Id. at 3969 ("If State authorities, including judges and juries applying State law,
were permitted to reach conclusions about the safety and effectiveness [of labels] ... the federal system for regulation of drugs would be disrupted.").
345. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1202 n. 11 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, I10TH CONG., MAJ. STAFF REP., FDA
CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES 4 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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a relatively lengthy three-page discussion, NHTSA took apart the earlier
asserted factual predicates one by one.346 First, after further testing by
NHTSA, the final rule disclaimed the NPRM's argument that improving
roof safety would also increase rollover propensity.347 Second, where the

NPRM asserted that state tort laws requiring improved roof crush resistance would divert resources away from developing new technologies to
avoid rollovers in the first instance, the final rule rebuked that assertion,
stating that "there is not a basis to conclude that such [diverted] resources
would otherwise have been used for improving rollover resistance or improving safety." 348 Third, the final rule disagreed with the automotive
industry's argument that increased roof crush resistance from state tort law
would create dangerous disparities in vehicle mass, stating that the indus3 49
try "did not provide technical analysis addressing ...the issue.
NHTSA Assistant Chief Counsel for Vehicle Rulemaking and Harmonization-who has been involved with preemption policymaking at NHTSA
for more than twenty years-likewise agreed that the original Roof Crush
Rule would not have survived scrutiny by NHTSA engineers and statisti350
cians.
Exhibit C for this kind of reform is the 2004 OCC Visitorial Powers
Rule that was revised in light of Cuomo. 351 In Cuomo, the Second Circuit
commented that "OCC does not appear to have found any facts at all in
promulgating its visitorial powers regulation. It accretes a great deal of
regulatory authority to itself at the expense of the states through rulemaking

346. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,380-83 (May 12, 2009) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571 & 585). I therefore take issue with Schwartz and Silverman's characterization
of NHTSA's shift in preemption policy as an unprincipled "abrupt[] change[] [of] course."
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 1221. They claim NHTSA reversed preemption in
the Roof Crush Rule with only a "two-sentence explanation." Id. It appears that the authors
looked only at the Executive Summary's description of "How This FinalRule Differsfrom the
NPRM... ," Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 22,349, as opposed to the federalism discussion thirty
pages later, which spans three pages, id. at 22,380-83. Compare Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Designated Seating Positions, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,185, 68,187-89 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to
be codified at 49 C.ER. pt. 571) (including NHTSA's explanation of how it interprets preemption and its analysis of state law and why it would not conflict, and soliciting comment from
state and local officials), with Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 1222 ("The agency's
explanation for this turn was only that it later found such conflicts 'unlikely,' speculating that
manufacturers would reduce seat width or install an impediment or void in vehicles rather than
undertake the additional expenses of providing an additional seat belt.").
347. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Red. at 22,382.
348.
349.
350.

Id.
Id. at 22,383.
Interview with Steve Wood, supra note 45.
351. For a description of the the Visitorial Powers Rule, see supra notes 172-179 and
accompanying text.
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that lacks any real intellectual rigor or depth. '352 Indeed, both the final
rule3 53 and the NPRM 54 read like legal briefs (complete with argument
subheadings), not like agency rulemakings. 355 There were no factual
findings in either rule explaining why preemption was necessary in the
specific case or what conflicts between state authorities and federal banks
justified preemption. There was nothing to suggest that state law
"significantly interfere[d]" with national bank activities under the relevant
Barnett preemption standard. 356 Rather, the rule laid out an argument for
why OCC was legally allowed to preempt state law, and responded to

CSBS's arguments that OCC was not authorized to preempt state law and
that preemption would undermine the dual state/federal banking system.3 57
In response, the Dodd-Frank Act requires agency preemption determinations to be evaluated under a "substantial evidence" standard. 358 The Act
mandates that evidence be made "on the record," which supports the "specific finding regarding the preemption" under the Barnett standard. 35 9 The
Act further directs courts evaluating agency preemption determinations by
OCC to assess their validity based on "thoroughness evident in the consideration" "validity of the reasoning" and "consistency with other valid
for review is likewise consistent
determinations." 36° This Skidmore36 standard
1
with the agency reference model.
352. Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2007), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
353. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
354. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363 (proposed Feb. 7, 2003) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28, & 34).
355. Clearing House Ass'n, 510 F.3d at 118 ("The administrative record here consists
almost entirely of the agency's interpretation of case law, legislative history, and statutory
text.").
356. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1044, 124 Stat. 1376, 2014 (2010) (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C(b)(1)(B)) (codifying
Barnett as preemption standard for banking preemption); see also Barnett Bank of Marion
Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
357. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1896-1903.
358. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (adding 12
U.S.C. § 5136C(c)).
359. Id. The Barnett standard requires a finding that the state law "prevents or significantly interferes with" the national bank's exercise of its national bank powers. Id.; see supra
text accompanying notes 198-204.
360. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1044(a) (adding 12
U.S.C. § 5136C(c)).
361. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 4, at 491-98 (making the
case for Skidmore, not Chevron, deference to agency determinations of preemption); id. at 498
("[Tihe choice of granting Skidmore as opposed to Chevron deference would fuel the agency
reference model by encouraging agencies to engage in ... notice-and-comment rulemaking
processes that, arguably, vet the agency decisionmaking process and make the agency respond
to substantive concerns raised by all affected parties."); see also Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2180 ("My own view has been that the agency's views should be
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OCC officials expressed skepticism that the "substantial evidence"
standard would appreciably affect their rulemakings, aside from perhaps
mandating explicit reference to the new standard.36 2 But OCC is aware that
proffering evidence in support of preemption enhances the likelihood that a
court will adopt its preemption conclusions. An OCC attorney specifically
cited American Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer 363 as an example where OCC made
factual findings to support its preemption determinations and garnered a
favorable result. 364 In Lockyer, California passed statutes requiring banks to
give more information to credit card customers about the implications of
carrying credit card debt and to provide options for customers to phone in
for explanations and to receive referrals for credit counseling.3 65 In its amicus brief, OCC argued that the requirements should be preempted because
they imposed significant operating costs on national banks and therefore on
customers, and because they interfered with national banks' abilities to exercise their powers to set terms, conditions, and interest rates for credit
cards.3 66 The court agreed with OCC's interpretation and found California
law preempted. 367 The high level of specificity and the significant factual
findings made by OCC in Lockyer, including the precise cost of the state
rule on national banks, poses an extremely sharp contrast to the complete
absence of a factual record in the Visitorial Powers Rule.
2. Consultation with the States
Federal agencies are consistently criticized for falling short in their efforts to consult with the states during the rulemaking process, especially
where preemptive rules are at issue. Congressional hearings on regulatory
preemption highlighted FDA's failure to consult with state and local officials
pursuant to E.O. 13132.368 NHTSA likewise came under fire for bypassing
state consultation. 369 And finally, the 2005 GAO Report criticized OCC for
accorded Skidmore 'power to persuade' (not Chevron mandatory) deference-a position apparently endorsed by the Court in [Levine].").
362.
363.
364.

OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.
239 F Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.

365. Lockyer, 239 F Supp. 2d at 1002-04.
366. Id. at 1013-15. The court also cited an OCC opinion letter that found portions of a
West Virginia statute preempted under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act because they imposed
significant operating costs on national banks. Id. at 1015. It is notable that OCC's West Virginia opinion letter distinguished between preempting the "significant" provisions and not
preempting West Virginia's requirement that credit and insurance documents for a loan be
processed separately when the insurance was a condition for the loan because it imposed only
paperwork burdens and some administrative costs. Id.
367.
368.

Id. at 1022.
See Hearingon Regulatory Preemption,supra note 85, at 144-45 (2007).

369. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2141 (criticizing
NHTSA's defense of its decision to forego state consultation in its preemptive rulemaking on
head restraint requirements); see also Letter from Carl Tubbesing, Deputy Exec. Dir., Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, to William Schoonover, Docket Operations, U.S. Dep't of
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failing to document any of its consultations with state representatives and
officials during the rulemaking process. 3 70 GAO also noted that the representative state groups complained that OCC did not adequately consult with
them in the rulemaking process. 37 1 Although OCC disputed most of GAO's
factual findings and asserted that they complied with the requirements of
E.O. 13132, OCC stated they intended to make improvements to their contold GAO they had already held several meetings to
sultation process37 and
2
further this goal.
Two separate, albeit related, issues present formidable challenges to the
Federalism Executive Order's state consultation mandate. First, it is not at
all clear who best represents state regulatory interests, particularly in the
context of consumer health and safety issues. OMB has specifically designated the "Big Seven" national organizations as representative of state and
local government officials for purposes of complying with the consultative
requirements of E.O. 13132. 373 At least in OMB's view, such elected officials are appropriate representatives of states and are best equipped to assess
the impact of a federal regulation on a state statute or regulation. But because preemption determinations increasingly displace state common law
liability, in addition to state legislative or regulatory standards, it is unclear
who represents the interests served by state tort law. State tort law wears at
least two hats: one compensatory, the other regulatory. Should the suitable
representatives of state regulatory interests be those who represent injured
victims (potential and actual), those who are engaged in health and safety
regulation at the state level, or both?
Second, the consultative process breaks down at both ends: while federal
agencies have rightly been criticized for bypassing consultation with the
states, at the same time it appears as though at times the state representatives
have not held up their end of the bargain, because participation in the3 rule74
making process by state and local government representatives is sparse.
Transp. (May 16, 2008) ("NCSL does not believe that one mailing constitutes meaningful
consultation as contemplated by E.O. 13132. In sum, [the agency's] attempts at meaningful
consultation were feeble at best and disingenuous at worst."); Oversight Hearing on Roof
Strength, supra note 2 (criticizing NHTSA's use of preamble preemption in its Roof Crush
Rule).
370. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 5.
371. Id. at 6-7.
372. Id. at 46-47, 53. OCC officials were not able to identify specific reforms that had
been undertaken in response to the 2005 GAO Report. OCC Telephone Interview, supra note

185.
373. Letter from Mickey Ibarra, Assistant to the President & Dir. of Intergovernmental
Affairs, to Donald J. Borut, Chair, Big 7 Orgs. (Mar. 9, 2000), reprinted in EPA GUIDANCE,
supra note 277, attachment C ("White House Letter on Consultation and List of 'Representative National Organizations' Contacts").
374. See Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2168 ("Some responsibility ... lies with the state governmental groups who may have opted out of engaging with the
federal agencies."); id. at 2166-67 (providing some examples where federal agencies reached
out to consult with the state governmental groups but received no comments back); see also
supra notes 93, 143 and accompanying text (providing more examples). Moreover, when state
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Most rules with potential preemptive effect receive no comments from
state or local government officials or their representatives. Granted, of the
fifty-three preemptive notices included in AAJ's study, twenty inserted
preemptive language into the final rule only after the notice-and-comment
period had closed." 5 But, in the remaining thirty-three proposed rules, state
representatives only submitted comments in four rulemakings: NCSL submitted a comment to a proposed chemical facility security regulation
promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security and to NHTSA's
proposed Roof Crush Rule.3 76 NAAG also voiced its objection to NHTSA's
proposed Roof Crush Rule. 37 7 State attorneys general filed comments in two
additional NHTSA rules addressing fuel economy standards for passenger
vehicles and standards for light trucks. 378 The reforms described here aim to

address both of these issues.
a. Expand AppropriateRepresentatives of State Regulatory Interests

i.Reach Out to the "Big Seven"
Of the agencies surveyed, EPA and NHTSA appear to be making concerted, good faith efforts to reach out to the "Big Seven" to establish good
working relations. By contrast, OCC maintains that they do no specific outreach to the "Big Seven," but instead hear from governors and state
legislators during the notice-and-comment process.379

As mentioned above, EPA's guidance document contains a list of contact
information for the "Big Ten" organizations. Moreover, EPA Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations hosts quarterly meetings with
the "Big Ten. ' 380 It would behoove the other federal agencies to compile
updated contact lists of relevant individuals within the "Big Seven" and also
to consider establishing some form of regularized personal contact in order
to build relationships.
Given the structure of the federal statutes that EPA implements, the
agency conducts relatively few formal consultations with the states pursuant
to E.O. 13132. From 2007 to 2010, EPA determined that a rule invoked E.O.
government groups do intervene in preemption disputes, they generally assert an antipreemption position that focuses on protection of state autonomy and issues of structural concern to
all states but does not stake out narrower policy positions on specific conflicts between state
and federal law.
375. See AM. Ass'N FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, app. B at 28-33.
376. Michael Jo, Who Represents the States? State Government Groups, Preemption,
and Horizontal Federalism 26 & app. H (Fall 2009) (unpublished directed research paper, New
York University, supervised by Professor Sharkey) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
For NCSL's efforts to defeat the Roof Crush Rule, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying
text.
377. Jo, supra note 376, app. II.
378.
379.

Id.
OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.

380.

Interview with EPA Officials, supra note 276.

February 2012]

Inside Agency Preemption

13132 in two final regulations and in one NPRM. 38 1 For each of these rules
(save the Stormwater Rule discussed above 382), EPA noted the steps it took
to consult with state and local officials and to meet E.O. 13132's requirements. For the NPRM on National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Area Sources, EPA said the proposed rule "may" have federalism implications, included a brief FIS, and stated:
EPA consulted with State and local officials in the process of developing
the proposed action to permit them to have meaningful and timely input into its development. EPA met with 10 national organizations representing
State and local elected officials to provide general background on the
proposal, answer questions, and solicit input from State/local governments.... In the spirit of Executive Order 13132, and consistent with EPA
policy to promote communications between EPA and State and local governments, EPA specifically
solicits comment on this proposed action from
33
State and local officials. 1
For the Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives in the Denver area, EPA
noted its regulation would have federalism implications and "may preempt
State law. '384 Accordingly, EPA consulted with Colorado state and local
government "early in the process ... to permit them to have meaningful and
timely input. '38 5 Based on this consultation, the final rule incorporated material requested by the state as "necessary to ensure the success of Colorado's
386
ozone action plan.
NHTSA likewise appears to be making renewed efforts to reach out and
consult with state and local officials. In a rulemaking on tire fuel efficiency
information for consumers, NHTSA expressly sought comment on preemption from state and local officials.3 87 NHTSA stated that it "sought public
comment on the scope of [the rule] generally, and in particular on whether,
and to what extent, [the rule] would or would not preempt tire fuel consumer information regulations that the administrative agencies of the State of

381. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Area Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,896, 31,922 (June 4, 2010); EPA
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Federal Volatility Control Program in the DenverBoulder-Greeley-Ft. Collins-Loveland, CO, 1997 8-Hour Ozone Nonattainment Area, 75 Fed.
Reg. 9107, 9110 (Mar. 1, 2010); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Con-

struction and Development Point Source Category, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,996, 63,055 (Dec. 1,2009)
(Stormwater Rule).
382. See supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text.
383. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Area Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,896, 31,922 (proposed June 4,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
384. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Federal Volatility Control Program in the
Denver-Boulder-Greeley-Ft. Collins-Loveland, CO, 1997 8-Hour Ozone Nonattainment Area,

75 Fed. Reg. at 9110.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,894, 15,941
(Mar. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.FR. pt. 575).
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California may promulgate in the future."38 8 To address "ambiguity" in the
statute's preemptive language, NHTSA sent a copy of the NPRM to "the
State of California, the National Governor's Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and the
National Association of Attorneys General." 38 9 Only the California Energy
Commission responded.3 90 NHTSA, in turn, issued a statement that
"NHTSA believes that it is premature to consider the applicability of the...
preemption provision. Moreover, NHTSA notes that it is ultimately a court,
esnot NHTSA, which would determine whether or not future regulations
391
tablished by the State of California are preempted under Federal law."
Given the limited response it received, NHTSA's statement was the responsible course. But this example shows that more work needs to be done
to identify the appropriate representatives of state interests and to ensure
that they respond when asked for comment.
ii. Encourage Development of Agency-Specific Liaison Groups
Several of the agencies have added organizations with relevant expertise
to the list of consultative groups. As mentioned above, EPA has expanded
the "Big Seven" to the "Big Ten." ECOS plays a particularly influential role.
Indeed, it was through dialogue with ECOS that EPA decided to lower its
threshold for federalism impact from $100 million
to $25 million at the time
3 92
it issued its November 2008 guidance document.
Like EPA, OCC reaches out to the representatives of its state regulatory
counterparts. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors is a trade association of state banking regulators. According to OCC officials, OCC shares
draft proposals with CSBS shortly before they are published; CSBS then
distributes the draft proposals to state bank supervisors. In 1999, OCC established by way of a series of letters regarding E.O. 13132 that CSBS
would serve as the liaison between OCC and states with respect to rulemaking. 393 With OCC, CSBS developed the model consumer complaint forms to
standardize information sharing.394 For state-chartered banks that establish
interstate branches, CSBS helped negotiate a nationwide state-federal
agreement for overlapping regulatory spheres, and has negotiated several
other agreements and understandings with federal regulators involved in

388.

Id.

389.

Id.

390.

Id.

391.

Id. at 15,942.

392. Interview with EPA Officials, supra note 276; Telephone Interview with Steven
Brown, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Council of the States (July 30, 2010).
393.

OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.

394. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CONSUMER COMPLAINT
MANAGEMENT: BEST PRACTICES 3, availableat http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Cooperative
-Agreements/Documents/CSBS-ConsumerComplaintBestPractices.pdf"
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banking.39 CSBS frequently comments on regulatory proposals from federal agencies involved in banking,396 and also occasionally files amicus briefs
on behalf of state banking regulators. 397 However, it appears that OCC has

focused on CSBS to the exclusion of state and local elected officials. The
2005 GAO Report noted that "[a]lthough OCC did send the drafts of the
proposed rules to CSBS, the extent to which it consulted with state officials
'398
appeared limited.
Like EPA and OCC-albeit the information is buried in its website as
opposed to in its guidance document-DOT lists three organizations on its
contact list in addition to the "Big Seven": the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials, the Association of Metropolitan
Planning Organizations, and the National Association of Regional Councils. 399 NHTSA has also experimented with a kind of focus group,
comprised not only of state officials, but also industry representatives and
others representing state regulatory interests (including tort law). For example, in the course of deciding whether to amend crash safety protection
requirements in school buses, NHTSA "convened a 'roundtable of State and
local government policymakers, school bus and seat manufacturers, pupil
transportation associations and consumer associations to address ... [sitate
and local policy perspectives' on the feasibility and desirability of a national
uniform requirement" before issuing the NPRM.4 °° Roundtable participants
included "representatives from states with compulsory seatbelt requirements,
individuals with expertise in seatbelt installation (and effects on passenger
capacity), and a representative from the National School Transportation As' 401
sociation.

395. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dep't of Treas., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and [State Agency] (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://
www.csbs.org/regulatory/Cooperative-Agreements/Documents/MOU-DOT-FINCEN.pdf.
396. See CSBS Comment Letters, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, http://www.csbs.org/
regulatory/policy/Pages/CSBS%20Comment%20Letters.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2011)
(listing twenty-five comment letters in 2011).
397. See, e.g., Brief of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Petitioner, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08453), 2009 WL 685656.
398. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 181, at 19.
399. Governmental Affairs, State & Local Organizations, OFFICE SEC. TRANSP., U.S.
DEP'T TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/ost/govaffairs/statelocal.htm (last visited Oct. 8,2011).
400. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2171-72 (alterations in original) (citing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seating Systems, Occupant Crash
Protection, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,509, 65,511 (proposed Nov. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571)).
401. Id. at 2172 (citing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seating Systems, Occupant Crash Protection, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, School Bus Passenger Seating and
Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,509, 65,511 (proposed Nov. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571)).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:521

iii. Introduce an Attorney General Notification Provision
Given the twin problems of identifying appropriate representatives of
state regulatory interests and the paucity of comments received from state
governmental organizations during the rulemaking process, I propose the
4°2
introduction of a novel notification provision to the state attorneys general
and to the National Association of Attorneys General.40 3 The proposal borrows from the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") settlement notice
provision, which mandates that notice of every class action settlement within CAFA's purview be provided to "appropriate" federal and state officials
and provides, by default, that the state representative be the attorney general
of any state in which any class member lives. 4 0 The intuition behind this
approach is that the top legal officer of the state ought to be able to distribute information relevant to a determination whether a certain proposed
rulemaking advances or impedes state interests to the relevant state agencies, officials, or other appropriate representatives.
The addition of an attorney general notification provision would provide
a formal mechanism to notify those well positioned to alert any and all interested participants in the rulemaking process. 4°5 After all, not every
interested participant combs the Federal Register for relevant rulemakings,
and the exclusive singling out of the "Big Seven" organizations for notification may no longer make sense, particularly in light of the rise of
rulemakings that preempt state tort law.
Indeed, the potential that state attorneys general represent has already
been recognized. 4 6 They are given a special role in the new Dodd-Frank
Act: the states can force the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
to take regulatory action on consumer protection issues. If a majority of the
states passes a resolution in support of establishing or modifying a Bureau
regulation, the Bureau must issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on the

402. All fifty state AGs have permanent email addresses. For a current listing of all AGs
and contact information, see Current Attorneys General, NAT'L Ass'N ATT'Ys GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/current-attomeys-general.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
403. James McPherson, Executive Director of NAAG, indicated his willingness to serve
as the point of contact for the federal agencies. Depending on the subject matter of the regulation, he would first send it to a relevant NAAG staff member, who would then forward it on to
his or her relevant contact person in each of the AG offices. November 10 Interview with
James McPherson, supra note 305.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(2) (2006). For an analysis of this provision and its early implications, see Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notification Provision: Optimal
Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1971 (2008).
405. The AG might function simply as a conduit for passing along the information to the
relevant state agency, which would not require any significant investment of resources, finan-

cial or human.
406. For a comprehensive list of federal acts that authorize state AG enforcement, see
Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 708-11
(2011).
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issue.4" 7 This provision also requires the Bureau to publish findings on certain specific considerations in response to a state petition, and it must send
copies of those findings to the House and Senate finance committees. 4°8 Un-

der the Act, state attorneys general also have the power to bring lawsuits
against banks in order to enforce federal regulations issued by the Bureau.4 9
CPSC has also come to recognize how useful state attorneys general can
be as vehicles for improving state participation. The general counsel explained that the CPSC chairman instituted a monthly call with the state
attorneys general offices. 4 10 Anywhere from twenty to thirty-five participants
from state attorney general offices with consumer protection responsibilities
typically participate in these calls.4 ' According to the general counsel,

"[t]his direct line of communication has proven very useful in engendering
state participation in rulemakings with preemptive effect. ' 412 This CPSC
state attorney general initiative supports both focusing on reaching out to
states early in the rulemaking process and providing notification to state
attorney general offices.
Over the years, attorneys general, sometimes coordinated by NAAG,
have challenged federal agencies' decisions to preempt state law, often via
amicus briefs. Historically, the attorneys general have focused their opposition to preemption in areas of robust state regulation, such as
environmental law, banking, and consumer protection. 4

3

But over time,

states have become increasingly interested in the preemption of state common law claims because of their experience with preemption in other realms,
4 14
such as banking, where state agencies are explicitly at risk.

407. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1041(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2011 (2010).
408. Id. § 1041(c)(2)-(3).
409. Id. § 1042(a)(1). If an AG wishes to bring an action under section 1042, he or she
must first consult with the Bureau. Id. § 1042(b). Moreover, the AGs may enforce only those
rules, not the statute itself. Id. § 1042(a)(2). As OCC officials pointed out, this was a deliberate
omission to prevent states from creating fifty different interpretations of the statute. OCC
Telephone Interview, supra note 185; see also 156 CONG. REc. S3868-72 (daily ed. May 18,
2010) (containing a debate on state AG enforcement provision discussing how amendments
"strike[] a balance" and "compromise" to allow supplemental enforcement from states without
creating conflicting authorities).
410. Email from Cheryl Falvey, supra note 248.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Interview with Dan Schweitzer, supra note 305. State AGs have tended to be most
engaged in OCC preemption, where the focus is on enforcement of state consumer financial
protection laws.
414. See Daniel Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen.,
Panelist Remarks at the New York University Annual Survey of American Law: Tort Law in
the Shadow of Agency Preemption (Feb. 27, 2009); see also Kevin 0. Leske & Dan Schweitzer, Frustratedwith Preemption: Why Courts Should Rarely Displace State Law Under the
Doctrine of FrustrationPreemption,65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 585 (2009).
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State attorneys general have intervened in lawsuits to protest preemption
of state common law.415 The attorney general notification provision would
capitalize on this burgeoning development and further expand the role of
state attorneys general in identifying the relevant state regulatory interests at
stake in preemptive rulemakings.
b. Focus on EarlierOutreach to States

An effort should be made to encourage agencies to consult with state
representatives early in the rulemaking process. The 1999 OMB guidance
document suggests that consultation should take place before the NPRM
and that the results 4of16 that consultation should be discussed in an FIS preamble to the NPRM .

However, most of the agencies still focus primarily, if not exclusively,
on state consultation during the notice-and-comment process. DOT's guidance document focuses on the notice-and-comment process, directing that
states should receive copies of NPRMs with preemptive effects and that
agencies should respond to any comment submitted by a state during notice-and-comment proceedings.4 17 There are no provisions for any
"meaningful" consultation outside of the notice-and-comment process or
before an NPRM is published. 418 OCC likewise maintains that the primary
mechanism 9of consultation with the states is the notice-and-comment
procedure.

41

Such exclusive focus on notice-and-comment proceedings denies states
substantial opportunities to contribute meaningfully to the development of
regulations, because they can only respond once NPRMs have already been
published.

415.

For example, one brief asserted:

The forty-seven amici states, as separate sovereigns in our federal system.., have a fundamental interest in preserving the appropriate balance of authority between the states
and the federal government .... In our view, courts should only rarely infer that Congress, although silent on the issue, nonetheless intended to displace state law where it is
possible to comply with both state and federal law.
Brief of Amici Curiae Vermont et al. in Support of Respondent at 1, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.
Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851613, at *1.
416.

OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35.

417. DOT GUIDANCE, supra note 323, VII-VIII.
418. There is just a cryptic addendum: "To the extent additional consultation is believed
to be warranted, contact should be made with the Office of the General or Chief Counsel, as
appropriate, for advice and approval ....
Id. VIII.A. 1. There is no discussion of when additional consultation is warranted or how DOT determines if it should be approved.
419.

OCC Telephone Interview, supra note 185.
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B. Office of Information and RegulatoryAffairs/Office
of Management and Budget
1. Direct Agencies to Publish Reports of Agency Compliance
with May 2009 Presidential Memorandum on Preemption
OIRA/OMB should direct agencies to publish their responses to the
Preemption Memorandum's directive to conduct a ten-year retrospective
review of preemptive rulemaking. Doing so would correct the perception
that the Preemption Memorandum has been largely ignored.42 Publication
of these reports would, along with individual agencies' publication of internal guidelines on compliance with E.O. 13132, signal renewed focus and
attention on the part of agencies to issues of federalism and agency preemption of state law.
2. Update the Office of Management and Budget Guidance Document
OMB's 1999 guidance document (and E.O. 13132) directs agencies to
send OMB the names of their designated federalism officials as well as consultation plans that describe how the agencies identify policies with
federalism implications and the procedures agencies use to ensure meaningful and timely consultation. 42 1 OIRA/OMB should bring this document up to
date, and include an updated list of state consultation groups and their con422
tact information.
In an effort to encourage greater transparency with respect to agency
compliance with E.O. 13132, OIRAIOMB should also direct agencies to
publish the names of their designated federalism officials and their consultation plans (along with the agencies' internal guidelines for compliance with
E.O. 13132).423
My survey of federal agencies revealed spotty compliance with the
OMB guidance documents. I did not uncover any evidence that OIRA/OMB
took steps to monitor agencies' submissions of required federalism official
designations or consultation plans, nor was this information generally publicly available. Apart from EPA, which incorporates its consultation plan in
its publicly available guidance document, DOT was the only agency to provide an explicit consultation plan that was submitted to OMB.424 The "plan,"

420.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

421. OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 4-5; Exec. Order No. 13,132,
§ 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 206, 209 (1999).
422. At a minimum, OIRA/OMB should inform agencies whom to contact in order to
submit the names of their designated federalism officials and their consultation plans.
423. OIRAIOMB should encourage agencies to post their relevant information in a fairly
consistent manner, such that the information is easy for interested parties to compile, assess,
and compare.
424. Letter from Nancy E. McFadden, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp., to John
Spotilla, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Mar. 13, 2000) [hereinafter DOT 3/13/00 Letter]. OCC
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however, merely states: "The Department intends to expand its efforts [to

consult] by proactively soliciting the involvement of the Big Seven or elect425
ed officials in those actions it identifies as warranting such participation."
This statement is followed by three pages of examples of agency consultation and working groups set up by the various DOT agencies on their own
accord.4 26 There is no general plan that explains how consultation should
happen, and, notably, the plan mentions NHTSA only once: "[NHTSA]
meets annually with State Highway Safety Offices to share information and
427
solicit ideas on grant projects.
3. Include a More Thorough Review of Preemption
in the Regulatory Review Process
At present, OIRA is responsible for monitoring agencies' compliance
with E.O. 13132.428 Under E.O. 12866, OIRA reviews "significant" pro429
posed regulations on a transactional, or rule-by-rule, basis.
According to OIRA officials, preemption and other federalism issues are
given significant attention in the regulatory review process.4 30 But OIRA's
431
review is hampered when agencies evade the requirements of E.O. 13132.
The 2003 GAO Report--examining a subset of eighty-five rules over a yearlong period-casts some doubt on the vigor of O1RA's policing of agency
compliance with E.O. 13132, finding only a single instance in which OMB
questioned an agency's conclusion regarding the absence of federalism implications in a rule.4 32 Stuart Shapiro, who worked on federalism issues as
has no record of sending any such description to OIRA/OMB. OCC Telephone Interview,
supra note 185.
425. DOT 3/13/00 Letter, supra note 424, at 1.
426. Id. at 1-4.
427. Id. at 3.
428. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 42-43 (outlining four criteria triggering OIRA review under E.O.
12866 and certification for compliance with E.O. 13132).
430. I conducted an interview with Kevin Neyland, OIRA Deputy Administrator, on July
14, 2010. Interview with Kevin Neyland, Deputy Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs,
in Washington, D.C. (July 14, 2010). I followed up with Neyland and Michael Fitzpatrick,
OIRA Associate Administrator, by telephone conversations on November 1, 2010, November
9, 2010, and November 12, 2010. Telephone Interviews with Kevin Neyland, Deputy Adm'r,
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, and Michael Fitzpatrick, Assoc. Adm'r, Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs (Nov. 1, 9 & 12, 2010). I also conducted an interview with Preeta Bansal,
OMB General Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor, and Boris Bershteyn, OMB Deputy General Counsel, on June 30, 2010. Interview with Preeta Bansal, Gen. Counsel & Senior Policy
Advisor, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and Boris Bershteyn, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, in Washington, D.C. (June 30, 2010).
431. Sharkey, FederalismAccountability, supra note 14, at 2177-78 ("[S]uch theoretical
[OMB] review provides cold comfort in the face of a reality in which agencies evade the requirements to produce [Federalism Impact Statements]."); see Mendelson, Chevron, supra
note 14, at 783-86 (describing poor record of agency compliance with E.O. 13132).
432. The 2003 GAO Report examined a subset of eighty-five health, safety, or environmental rules that were submitted to OMB for review between July 2001 and June 2002. Only a single
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assistant branch chief at OIRA in the late 1990s and early 2000s, confirmed
the impression left by the 2003 GAO Report:
These [federalism] issues were a lower priority at OIRA than those more
central to the analytical mission of the agency. If OIRA were to be able to
exercise meaningful oversight of federalism issues, the staff would have to
expanded to include a couple of individuals with expertise in this arbe 433
ea.

In response to the increasing aggressiveness of federal agencies in
preempting state law, several scholars have proposed strengthening OIRA's
role to directly oversee federal regulatory policy and better ensure compliance with E.O. 13132.434 The ABA has adopted a resolution that "urges the
President to improve agency compliance with E.O. 13132 by requiring inclusion of an entity independent of the agency regulatory office with
review
sufficient autonomy, authority, and resources to conduct an effective
'4 35
in the rule-making process before a preemptive rule is adopted.
rule was cited in which OMB was "concerned with EPA's conclusion that th[e] proposed rule did
not have federalism implications." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING:
OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE

REVIEWS app. 11at 182 (2003), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf. In one other
case, OMB changed the language in the federalism section in a rule's preamble, but did not require further agency action. Id. app. I at 139.
433. Email from Stuart Shapiro, Assoc. Professor & Dir. of Pub. Policy Program, Rutgers Univ., to Catherine M. Sharkey, Professor of Law, N.Y Univ. Sch. of Law (Nov. 2, 2010,
10:32 EST) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). I conducted telephone interviews with
Professor Shapiro on May 28, 2010 and October 21, 2010. Telephone Interviews with Stuart
Shapiro, Assoc. Professor & Dir. of Pub. Policy Program, Rutgers Univ. (May 28, 2010 & Oct.
21, 2010). Shapiro may understate the extant legal expertise at OIRA, where both the Administrator (Cass Sunstein) and Associate Administrator (Michael Fitzpatrick) are lawyers.
Moreover, OIRA could take advantage of the legal expertise within OMB's General Counsel
Office by having that office review agency preemptive regulations as a matter of course.
According to some scholars, however, OMB sees its primary role as cost reduction, not
regulatory oversight. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight
of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263-68 (2006) (describing how OIRA
focused on cost reduction at the expense of regulatory coordination).
434.

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER

No. 809, LIMITING FEDERAL AGENCY PREEMPTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW FEDER-

EXECUTIVE ORDER 5-6 (2008) ("President Obama could use the new Federalism
Executive Order to establish an office within OIRA that would have the legal expertise
to review agencies' compliance with the Order."), available at http://www.
progressivereform.org/articles/ExecOrder_- Preemption_- 809.pdf; Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 14, at 2178 & n.209 (describing OIRA review under E.O. 12866 as a
potential "template" for expanded review under E.O. 13132); Memorandum from Authors of
Advancing the Public Interest Through Regulatory Reform to Michael Fitzpatrick, Assoc.
ALISM

Admin'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, and Kevin Neyland, Deputy Adm'r & Acting
Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Mar. 31, 2009) (commenting on relationship
between OIRA and federal agencies), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/

fedRegReview/advancing-attachment.pdf"
435.

ABA Res, 117, supra note 340. The accompanying ABA Report explains that

"[s]uch an independent entity might be OIRA, an office in the Department of Justice, or simply an office in the agency proposing the rule if that office has sufficient autonomy, authority, and
resources for effective review." AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON RES. 117, at 8 (2010), available
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OIRA, as the central coordination locus for regulatory review, is well
positioned to more thoroughly review agency proposals to preempt state
law. For certain regulations-those subject to OMB review under E.O.
12866 436-the Federalism Executive Order requires a designated federalism
official in each agency to certify that the order's requirements "have been
met in a meaningful and timely manner" in developing regulations with federalism implications. 43 7 But OMB is given little to review; 438 it is asked
simply for a vote of confidence in the federalism officer's conclusion. If
my recommendations are followed, however, agencies would have their
own internal review of the factual predicates supporting preemption, and
their analyses could then be reviewed by OIRA. This would go a long way
toward enhancing OIRA's level of trust and confidence in the agency's
submissions.

As an initial matter, OIRA should also include review of the federalism
implications of agency preemptive rules within its checklists under the A-4
circular. 439 Moreover, OIRA should consider the feasibility of requiring
agency certification of compliance with E.0 13132's consultation and FIS
mandates for all agency rulemakings that preempt state law (not just those
subject to E.O. 12866). 440

at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 l-build/medical-liability/med mal_
resolution 117.authcheckdam.pdf.
436. Certification to OMB is required only for "significant" regulations. See supra note 42.
437. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 8(a), 3 C.F.R. 206, 210 (1999); see also OMB Guidance
for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 3 ("For any draft final regulation with federalism implications that is submitted for OIRA review under E.O. 12866, the federalism official must certify
that the requirements of E.O. 13132 concerning both the evaluation of federalism policies and
consultation have been met in a meaningful and timely manner.").
438. See OMB Guidance for E.O. 13132, supra note 35, at 15 app. B ("Recommended
Format for Section 8(a) Certification"). The recommended certification reads in its entirety: "I
certify that [agency] complied with the requirements of E.O. 13132 for the attached draft final
regulation, [title, RIN #]." Id.
439. Circular A-4 from Office of Mgmt. & Budget to Heads of Exec. Agencies & Establishments: Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/circularsa004_a-4/. The A-4 circular "provides [OMB's] guidance to Federal agencies
on the development of regulatory analysis." Id. Nowhere in the A-4 circular is there direction
to ensure that agencies have met the procedural requirements of the preemption provisions of
E.O. 13132.
Note that the A-4 circular applies only to economically significant rules under section 3(f)(1) of E.O. 12866 (defined as having an annual effect on the economy of at least $100
million) and would therefore not apply to rules reviewed under other provisions, such as the
"novel legal/policy" review. See supra note 42. According to an empirical study of OMB regulatory review during the period 1981-2000, 5 percent of the rules OMB reviewed met the
"economically major/significant" criterion (i.e., section 3(f)(1)); the remaining 95 percent
were "otherwise major/significant" (i.e., section 3(f)(2)-(4)). Steven Croley, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 821, 846
(2003).
440. OIRA review under any of the four criteria for E.O. 12866 review listed in section 3(f), see supra note 42, should trigger a certification of compliance with E.O. 13132 by
the agency per E.O. 13132 section 8(a). But it remains unclear whether every preemptive
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CONCLUSION

Federal agencies hold the key to preemption decisionmaking in the future. Until very recently, their regulatory actions and interpretive positions
have exerted a sub rosa influence on judicial decisions, which have instead
emphasized Congress's direction. But the U.S. Supreme Court has now
made federal agencies' role overt. This shift in institutional power has the
potential to reshape the preemption landscape, by directing efforts away
from Congress and the courts and toward the administrative rulemaking
process within federal agencies. Stakeholders with vested interests in
preemption disputes, such as state governmental organizations and other
representatives of state interests, state attorneys general, consumer- and
business-oriented organizations, and private litigants, can continue to ignore
the preemptive rulemaking processes within federal agencies only at their
peril.
As this Article further shows, those processes are, in and of themselves, rich areas of investigation. I have taken a close and in-depth view
of the preemptive rulemaking processes within five significant federal
agencies that regulate in areas as diverse as health and safety, banking, and
the environment. In so doing, I have uncovered key areas for reform and
have devised specific solutions, including a novel attorney general
preemption notification provision and a blueprint for external OIRA/OMB
review of newly proposed internal oversight procedures. This journey inside
agency preemption charts preemption's future path.

rulemaking for which agencies are required to submit a federalism impact statement to
OMB per section 6(c)-would meet the E.O. 12866 section 3(f) criteria.
One possibility would be for OIRA to interpret E.O. 12866 section 3(f)(4) ("[r]aise novel
legal or policy issues") to apply categorically to agency preemptive rulemakings and to so
instruct the agencies.

596

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:521

